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BE NOT AFRAID OF CHANGE:,
TIME TO ELIMINATE THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
Nicole Huberfeldt
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a bit of an intellec-
tual Mobius strip. It was created as an ethical constraint by the
American Medical Association ("AMA") to prevent quackery and
commercial exploitation of physicians. The doctrine was codified
through state law and entrenched through courts' interpretation of the
general rule that all individuals must be licensed to provide medical
services in the state in which they practice. The requirement that in-
dividuals must be licensed has been consistently interpreted to stand
for the larger proposition that corporations cannot practice medicine.
This precept reaches much farther than delivery of medical care; it
also relates to payment for medical services, management of medical
practices, employment and engagement of physicians, patient rela-
tions, and more. The intellectual hitch is that the laws that collec-
tively comprise the doctrine do not create a framework that either
stands alone or that has a logical conclusion, and yet courts continue
to enforce it.
Simply stated, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine pre-
vents persons or entities that are not licensed by the state in which
they are located from providing physician or other medical services or
from excessively influencing the delivery of those services. The
modem version of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine derives
from two principles: (1) any person that "practices medicine" must be
licensed by the state in which she practices to provide medical ser-
vices2 and (2) health care professionals cannot assist unlicensed per-
' "[B]e not afraid of greatness. Some are born great, some achieve great-
ness, and some have greatness thrust upon 'em." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH
NIGHT, act 2, sc. 5. It is time that the states have change thrust upon them for the sake
of health care efficiency, quality, and modernity.
t Health Law Faculty Fellow and Director of the Healthcare Compliance
Certification Program, Seton Hall Law School. Thanks to Professor John V. Jacobi
for guidance and encouragement and to Deborah Kelly for excellent research assis-
tance. Many thanks to David J. Treacy for all of his support.
2 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-401 (Lexis 2002); 225 ILL. COMP.
sons or entities in practicing unlicensed medicine, which prevents the
splitting of professional fees with non-professionals.
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is manifested in three
ways. First, a non-licensed person or corporation cannot employ a
physician or any other health care professional to practice medicine.
Second, entities that provide health care services, including partner-
ships, professional corporations, limited liability companies, and non-
profit corporations, generally cannot be owned or controlled by non-
licensed persons or general corporations. Third, licensed profession-
als may not divide or share a professional fee with a non-licensed per-
son or entity, because such "fee-splitting" can be considered assisting
an unlicensed person to practice medicine and could be an improper
influence on the professional's behavior.4
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a relic; a physician-
centric guild doctrine that is at best misplaced, and at worst obstruc-
tive, in the present incarnation of the American health care system.
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a remnant of a time
when doctors with black bags made house calls, and hospitals were a
place where people went to be "bled" and to die. In increasingly inte-
STAT. ANN. 60/3 - 3.5 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-5.1 to 45:9-6 (West 1991
& Supp. 2003); TEX. OCc. CODE. ANN. § 155.001 (Vernon 1999). Every state has
some form of professional licensure statutes and/or unauthorized practice statutes;
they are too numerous to list here.
3 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 54-1814 (Michie 2003) (stating that licensed pro-
fessionals can be disciplined for splitting fees for professional services, in exchange
for referrals, and for aiding an unlicensed person to practice medicine). See also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.091 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (stating that aiding unlicensed
persons and fee splitting are both grounds for disciplinary action); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 630.305 (Michie Supp. 2001) (stating that aiding an unlicensed person in the
practice of medicine is grounds for disciplinary action or denying licensure); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 448.08 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (stating that a licensed professional
may not engage in fee sharing). Similarly, professional service corporation acts often
prevent anyone but licensed professionals from owning professional corporations.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-4-383 (1999) (stating that each shareholder of a profes-
sional corporation must be duly licensed); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-134(d) (2003)
(stating that all shareholders of a professional service corporation must be licensed to
practice medicine in Colorado); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A: 17-3, 14A: 17-5 (West 2003)
(stating that only a licensed professional may organize and become a shareholder of a
professional corporation); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-101 Comments, 33-19-130, 33-
19-200 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (stating that only the professionally licensed may be
shareholders in a professional corporation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-610 (Supp.
2003) (stating that a professional corporations can only issue shares to a non-licensed
professional if the licensing authority specifically allows).
4 The reasoning behind the prohibition on fee-splitting is that the unlicensed
person or entity is not bound by the same rules of law and ethics as the health care
professional, and, therefore, should not share in the fees generated from professional
services. This is also true of lawyers. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
REsPoNsiBILTY" EC 3-8 (1980).
grated health care delivery systems, the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine does nothing to improve quality, efficiency, or accountabil-
ity. Also, in this era of managed care reimbursement, where physi-
cians are forced to bear the risk of providing patients too much time or
too many services, the time has come to realize and accept that physi-
cians are, in fact, influenced by financial gain (or loss). This is not to
condemn physicians for being influenced by monetary issues; it is
simply an important and essential observation that physicians have
become inextricably intertwined with health care-financing and health
care-providing corporations that do-and must-influence medical
decision-making.
This article focuses on three key reasons that the corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine should be laid to rest. First, the motives for
creating the corporate practice of medicine doctrine are long gone; it
has been some time since physicians have been able to operate as a
guild of autonomous providers of health care. The delivery and fi-
nancing of health care places physicians in an integrated system that is
only frustrated by the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Sec-
ond, it is disingenuous to pretend that physicians are not influenced by
financial gain. This is handily evidenced by the federal and state pro-
hibitions against physician self-referral and by the exodus from Medi-
care and Medicaid that is the result of ever-decreasing reimbursement
rates. Third, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine does nothing
to advance error-free, high quality health care and may actually inhibit
improving the quality of health care. Recent reports by the Institute of
Medicine demonstrate and emphasize this point.
In order to overcome the many manifestations of the state-based
corporate practice of medicine doctrine, this article proposes federal
legislation to effectuate alignment among the states on this issue. The
goal is not to preempt states' oversight of licensure and health care
quality, but simply to allow all doctors, whatever their venue, to prac-
tice in an integrated environment that will benefit patients and facili-
tate the continued development of this increasingly complex, special-
ized, and interconnected health care delivery system.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
A. AMA Ethical Guidelines
The prohibition against corporations practicing or influencing the
practice of medicine was conceived by the AMA in 1847 not only to
protect the public, but also to protect the profession of medical doc-
tors.5 At the time, medical doctors struggled to separate themselves
from so-called "irregulars," faith healers, and other "quacks" who
professed to cure human ailments.6 As a part of the effort to differen-
tiate medically trained doctors, the AMA created ethical guidelines to
garner the respect of the general public. The AMA also issued pro-
nouncements by its Judicial Council that served to guide the medical
community and impress upon the public the seriousness and viability
of the medical profession. These pronouncements contained warnings
against the practice of medicine by a corporation, regardless of its
intent, structure, or form.7 The pronouncements also formed the
foundation for building a guild of professional medical doctors who
were to behave and treat one another differently than those who did
not belong to this guild.8
5 The AMA Principles of Medical Ethics stated:
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under condi-
tions that make it impossible to render adequate service to his patient or
which interfere with reasonable competition among the physicians of a
community. To do this is detrimental to the public and to the individual
physician, and lowers the dignity of the profession.
AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. 3, art. 6, sec. 2, reprinted in
AM. MED. ASS'N, AMERICAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY 15 (15th ed. 1938). For discus-
sions of the AMA's attempt to distinguish itself from "sectarianism and quackery," as
well as to regulate medical education, see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corpo-
rate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care
Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445,449-50 (1987); Adam M. Freiman, Comment, The
Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a
Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care Environment, 47 EMORY L.J. 697,
699-700 (1998); Brian Monnich, Note, Bringing Order to Cybermedicine: Applying
the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine to Tame the Wild Wild Web, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 455,467-68 (2001).
6 Cf JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE:
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE 27-28 (1999) (discussing the formal
and informal tools employed by professionals to sanction unorthodox colleagues); see
also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 5, at 448-49 (describing the 19tb century as a highly
competitive period for doctors trying to distinguish themselves and gain respect).
7 The AMA Judicial Council noted:
It was decided long ago that the practice of law by a corporation was
against public policy and the same has been prohibited by law in many
states. The relations between patient and physician are more intimate than
are those between client and attorney. It is impossible for that intimacy of
relationship to exist between and [sic] individual and a corporation and if it
is against public policy for a corporation to practice law, how much more so
must it be for a corporation to practice medicine.
AM. MED. ASS'N, 1922 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (interpreting Section 6 of
the Principles of Medical Ethics), abstracted in PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 40
(1960).
8 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care:
Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 825, 827-28 (1995). Jost
The prohibition preventing physicians from practicing what was
literally "corporate medicine" was a reaction by the AMA to at least
three business formats that had emerged in the late 1800s. In the first,
businesses were hiring physicians to provide full-time medical care
for their employees.9 This occurred most often in the industrial set-
ting, wherein a large employer such as a railroad, plant, mine, or fac-
tory would hire a physician or group of physicians to provide care for
employees and their families.' 0 This was sometimes dubbed "contract
practice."
In the second format, general business corporations, fueled by the
ambition of entrepreneurs, hired staffs of physicians and marketed
physicians' services to the general public.1 Such entrepreneurs prof-
ited from the staff physicians' services without obtaining medical
licensure themselves. Physicians were employed by laypersons who
had no medical experience and who were not bound by medical or
ethical restraints, and who were thus reputed to be motivated solely by
profit. 12
writes that the "regulation of health care professionals in the United States is primar-
ily a product of the late nineteenth century.... During this early period licensure
authority was often delegated by statute to the medical societies and was generally
guild-like in nature." Id. See also BUREAU OF MED. ECON., AM. MED. Ass'N,
EcoNoMIcs AND THE ETHICS OF MEDICINE 8 (1936) (stating that organized medicine
was modeled on the ethics and form of historical guild associations).
9 See generally Alanson W. Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice
of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 432, 464-66 (1959-60) (providing a history of these
employer-operated medical operations). In response to such industrial employment,
the AMA revised the Principles of Medical Ethics to read:
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional attain-
ments or services to any lay body, organization, group, or individual...
under terms or conditions which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary
or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual employing
him. Such a procedure is beneath the dignity of professional practice, is un-
fair competition with the profession at large, is harmful alike to the profes-
sion of medicine and the welfare of the people, and is against sound public
policy.
AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. 3, art. 6, sec. 5, reprinted in
AM. MED. Ass'N, AMERICAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY 15 (15th ed. 1938).
10 Willcox, supra note 9, at 464.
1" See Francis J. Serbaroli, Origins of the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Prohibition in Public Policy and Medical Ethics, HEALTH L. & Bus. SER. (BNA) No.
2800.03 (1999).
The trend also included forming corporations to employ other profession-
als, such as lawyers. An important New York case revoked the certificate of incorpo-
ration of an entity that employed and marketed the services of lawyers. See In re Co-
operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910). The Co-operative Law court wrote, "[a]
corporation can neither practice nor hire lawyers to carry on the business of practicing
law for it any more than it can practice medicine or dentistry by hiring doctors or
dentists to act for it." Id. at 16. The law surrounding legal practice has developed in
The third format involved the creation of hospitals by public
agencies and by private philanthropists. Those who created hospitals
sought to centralize the provision of health care and to employ physi-
cians, but both actions would have resulted in a loss of autonomy for
physicians. 13 When hospitals were first created, some courts would
not entertain the idea that the hospital was itself providing medical
services. For instance, a Missouri court in 1907 could not imagine
that hospitals (or other corporations) were practicing medicine be-
cause hospitals were a conduit for physicians to treat patients. 14 Nev-
ertheless, the AMA perceived hospitals to be a threat to physicians'
autonomy.
Each of these business formats inspired a fear of loss of control
over physicians' services and a fear of control over physicians' in-
come, patient-load, methods of treatment and diagnosis, and patient
relationships in general.1 5  To address these concerns, the AMA
drafted ethical guidelines that attempted to distinguish physicians as a
new, unique breed of medical professional and that reflected a strug-
gle for recognition of physicians as the sole source of legitimate
medical services. The AMA sought to establish the autonomy of
medical doctors as independent decision-makers who cared for noth-
ing but the scientific treatment of patients. 16 The AMA thus trafficked
in self-regulation of physicians in order to improve clinical practices,
expose quacks, and expel those unworthy of carrying the title "physi-
cian" because of moral turpitude or deficient medical practices.17
analogous ways to the law surrounding the practice of medicine, including preventing
lawyers from practicing across state lines. States have started to revisit this prohibi-
tion for lawyers. See, e.g., Henry Gottlieb, Court Panels Urge Doing Away with
Parochial Practice, 170 N.J. L.J. 925 (2002) (reporting that two committees of the
New Jersey Supreme Court have endorsed proposals by the American Bar Associa-
tion that would facilitate inter-state legal practice in certain situations).
13 See generally, ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 20 (explaining how doctors in
hospitals run by philanthropists and public agencies had limited independence).
14 See State ex inf. Sager v. Lewin, 106 S.W. 581, 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907)
(stating that corporations running hospitals "do not practice medicine, but they re-
ceive patients and employ physicians and surgeons to give them treatment. No one
has ever charged that these corporations were practicing medicine.").
IS See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 5, at 446-47 (explaining that the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine sprang up at the turn of the 20th century as a way to
keep physicians free from corporate control).
16 See Freiman, supra note 5, at 701-03 (describing the actions the AMA took
in response to corporate involvement in medicine).
17 ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 16. The effects of the AMA's guidelines can
be seen in physician employment contracts even now, which often contain provisions
for termination in the event of criminal action, performance below accepted medical
standards, or upon evidence of moral turpitude. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N,
AMERIcAN MEDICAL AssocIATIoN ANNOTATED MODEL PHYsIctAN EMPLOYMENT
The guidelines, and lobbying by the AMA, greatly affected state
legislation. States were counseled to license medical doctors, not only
to regulate the sources of medical care for unknowing consumers,'
8
but also to establish medical doctors as the sole legitimate profession-
als for the provision of health care. The result was a plethora of laws
and regulations regarding licensure of persons to become doctors, and,
indirectly, legitimization of limiting the practice of medicine to physi-
cians. Additionally, states were encouraged to prohibit fee-splitting, a
derivative of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine that pre-
vented payments for referrals, whether from a physician or from a
corporation. The prohibition against fee-splitting also prevented phy-
sicians from sharing their reimbursement for services with any non-
licensed person or entity. The prohibition grew out of a desire to pre-
vent corporations from profiting from the professional services of
physicians, as with the second scenario described above, in which
nonlicensed individuals or businesses were able to share in physi-
cians' professional income. The president of the AMA, Dr. William
J. Mayo, wrote in 1906 that fee-splitting was a "pernicious practice"
and a "crying evil" that had to be eradicated.' 9
B. State Licensure, Law, and Case Law
As early as the 1870s, physicians successfully lobbied for licen-
sure statutes. 20 At that early stage of the medical profession, medical
colleges were not accredited, and becoming a physician required noth-
ing more than a degree from a college that called itself a medical
school.2' Initial state laws simply required a diploma to practice
medicine.22 Within a few decades, however, states had created licens-
ing boards empowered by statute to review diplomas and reject candi-
dates for licensure that appeared unworthy.23 States also created inde-
pendent state examinations as prerequisites to licensure.
At the AMA's urging, states created statutory licensure require-
ments that only permitted natural persons to be licensed to practice
AGREEMENT 15 (2000), at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/upload/mm/46/model_physician aug.pdf.
18 See Freiman, supra note 5, at 700-01 (explaining how the AMA's success-
ful lobby for state statutes allowed it to gain further control over the medical profes-
sion through medical education reform).
19 William J. Mayo, M.D., The Medical Profession and the Issues Which
Confront It, 46 JAMA 1737 (1906). This was the same Dr. Mayo who is the name-
sake of the Mayo Clinic.
20 Chase-Lubitz, supra note 5, at 451.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 451-52.
medicine.24 Such laws demanded that individuals seeking licensure
must qualify, for example, by obtaining a degree from an accredited
medical school, passing a state examination, performing an internship
and residency, and demonstrating physical and mental soundness.
Inherent in such requirements was the implication that corporations
could not achieve such goals.25
The state licensure requirements were accompanied by a push
from the AMA in the early 1900s to reform medical schools. Upon
their inception, medical schools did not have a system of accreditation
or any way to differentiate themselves from the schools that trained
irregulars.26  The AMA created entrance requirements, instituted a
uniform curriculum, and standardized the duration of study.27 The
effect was to raise the bar for medical school applicants and entrants,
which influenced the quality of students and, thus, the prestige of the
medical profession as a whole. This contributed to the perception of
physicians that arose in the early 1900s-and that remains today-of
the physician as an omniscient healer and autonomous health care
provider.28
Most medical practice acts are simply licensure statutes that list
the qualifications needed to obtain a license to practice medicine, and
they require that no person practice medicine without a license.
29
24 See Glenn E. Bradford, J.D. & David G. Meyers, M.D., The Legal and
Regulatory Climate in the State of Missouri for Complementary and Alternative
Medicine - Honest Disagreement Among Competent Physicians or Medical McCar-
thyism?, 70 U.Mo. K.C. L. REv. 55, 61 (2001) (noting that many blame the AMA for
the resurgence of licensure laws at the turn of the twentieth century).
25 Cf ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 13 (explaining that the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine assumes that corporate hospitals have different objectives than
physicians and reflects America's historical distrust of big business).
26 See Bradford & Meyers, supra note 24, at 62 (noting that many medical
schools were found to be substandard in 1910, and the new regulations forced them
out of business).
27 Id. at 62 n.47, citing Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United
States and Canada, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin
No. 4 (1910) (stating that in 1904 the AMA established a Council on Medical Educa-
tion with a mandate to elevate the standards of medical education).
28 That this was the goal of the AMA is clear; the Principles of Medical
Ethics uses language that is microcosmic of this, including such phrases as "dignity of
professional practice" repeatedly. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, ch. 3, art. 6, sec. 5, reprinted in AM. MED. ASS'N, AMERICAN MEDICAL
DIRECTORY 15 (15th ed. 1938).
29 Some states have explicitly prohibited the corporate practice of medicine.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2400 (West 2003) (stating that corporations have
no professional rights, privileges, or powers); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-
134(g)(IV)(7) (2003) (stating that corporations shall not practice medicine); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. 1701.03 (West Supp. 2003) (stating that no corporation can exercise
control over the professional clinical judgment of a licensed practitioner).
Licensure statutes were given teeth in the corporate practice of medi-
cine context by judicial determinations that, because they pertain in-
herently and explicitly to individuals, such laws preclude corporations
from engaging in medical practice in any sense of the word.30  The
general idea was that corporations did not have the characteristics
necessary and inherent to practicing medicine because, for example,
they could not attend medical school, obtain licenses to become phy-
31
sicians, or treat patients.
Also, policy played a part in creating and extending the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine.32 The major concerns were threefold.
First, it was argued that if corporations were permitted to employ phy-
sicians, physicians' loyalty would be inevitably divided between their
employer and their patients.33  Second, non-professionals' control
30 See, e.g., Neill v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 199 A. 178 (Pa. 1938). The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, preventing a department store from employing an optometrist,
wrote:
A corporation as such cannot possess the personal qualities required of a
practitioner of a profession. Its servants, though professionally trained and
duly licensed to practice, owe their primary allegiance and obedience to
their employer rather than to the clients or patients of their employer. The
rule stated recognizes the necessity of immediate and unbroken relationship
between a professional man and those who engage his services.
Id. at 181.
31 See, e.g., People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 275 P. 928, 930-31 (Colo.
1929) (holding that a corporation cannot qualify for licensure because it is not a natu-
ral person, and that hiring licensed dentists qualified as engaging in the practice of
dentistry and was, therefore, prohibited). Cf Ezell v. Ritholz, 198 S.E. 419 (S.C.
1938) (noting that even optometrists, because they were working as agents for a
nonlicensed entity, were not "practicing 'in the due course of their private profes-
sional practice'). That court captured the sentiment of many state courts contemplat-
ing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, writing:
If [corporate practice] were sanctioned the logical result would be that cor-
porations and business partnerships might practice law, medicine, dentistry
or any other profession by the simple expedient of employing licensed
agents. And if this were permitted professional standards would be practi-
cally destroyed, and professions requiring special training would be com-
mercialized, to the public detriment. The ethics of any profession is based
upon personal or individual responsibility. One who practices a profession
is responsible directly to his patient or his client. Hence he cannot properly
act in the practice of his vocation as an agent of a corporation or business
partnership whose interests in the very nature of the case are commercial in
character.
Id. at 424.
32 See, e.g., Barton v. Codington, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942) ("Being
convinced that the practice of the learned professions by a profit corporation tends to
the commercialization and debasement of those professions.., such a mode of con-
ducting the practice is in contravention of the public interest and is against public
policy.").
33 See, e.g., State Bd. of Optometry v. Gilmore, 3 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 1941)
over medical decision-making and judgment was considered to be
inherently harmful.34 Third, commercial exploitation of physicians
and their practices was deemed intrinsically unacceptable because
laypersons were not subject to the licensure standards and ethical re-
quirements by which professionals were bound.35  Courts embraced
each of these arguments when considering the corporate invasion of
medicine that occurred in the early 1900S. 3
6
Thus, licensure statutes acted as a foundation for court-enhanced
creation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Without judi-
cial opinion and policymaking, the doctrine likely would not have
become central to the structure of the health care industry. Interest-
ingly, some state courts have begun to reject the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine as a reason to, for instance, negate physicians' con-
tracts with hospitals (which are corporate entities). 37 But such deci-
(finding that it is illegal for an optometrist to practice in the employment of a jewelry
store because of the inherent conflicting loyalties); Neill v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 199 A.
178 (Pa. 1938) (fearing that a corporation's servants, even if professionally trained,
might still owe the corporation allegiance over their patient); State ex rel. Loser v.
Nat'l Optical Stores Co., 225 S.W.2d 263, 268-69 (Tenn. 1949) (noting that if a cor-
poration were permitted to practice medicine that professional standards would be
"practically destroyed ... to the public detriment" because of the deceased account-
ability topatients).34See, e.g., People ex rel. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Pacific Health Corp.,
82 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1938) (noting the problem of lay control of the profession and
the diminution of choice of providers if a corporation limits the public to only a par-
ticular group of doctors); Bennett v. Indiana State Bd. of Registration and Examina-
tion in Optometry, 7 N.E.2d 977, 981-82 (Ind. 1937) (stating that the relationship
between the licensed optometrist and the unlicensed employer is that of master and
servant which creates a pressure on the licensed practitioner to disregard the best
interests of his patient); People v. Carroll, 264 N.W. 861, 863 (Mich. 1936) (noting
the high degree of professional knowledge a dentist needs and arguing that separating
such skill and knowledge from complete control over the practice is "evil"); State ex
rel. Bricker v. Buhl Optical Co., 2 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ohio 1936) (arguing that a com-
pany cannot lawfully exercise control over an optometrist or perform any act that
amounts to the practice of optometry).
35 See, e.g., State v. Boren, 219 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Wash. 1950) (explaining
that the state has a right to protect its citizens, who rely on the skill and ethical train-
ing of their physician, from those practicing without a license or proper examination);
Funk Jewelry Co. v. State ex rel. La Prade, 50 P.2d 945, 945-47 (Ariz. 1935) (distin-
guishing professions which involved relationships of personal privacy and public
health with those such as druggists, architects, and other vocations where no such
relationship exists); Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67, 71-72 (Cal. 1932)
(explaining that one must have license to show both "moral character" and proper
training because of the immense control the professional has over their patient); Win-
berry v. Hallihan, 197 N.E. 552, 556 (I11. 1935) (holding that no corporation shall
practice dentistry without the proper license because of the legislature's right to pro-
tect the public and the medical profession itself from the untrained and unskilled).
36 See cases cited supra notes 33-35 for examples.
37 See, e.g., Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114
sions are often limited in scope and are slow to address the structural
difficulties that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has cre-
ated.
C. Manifestations in Modem Delivery of Medical Care
The AMA wanted to prevent corporations from influencing phy-
sicians in the number of patients seen and in the independent medical
decisions that the AMA believed should be entirely free of layperson
and corporate control.38 The AMA was concerned that corporate
practice of medicine would require physicians to carry excessive
caseloads that would diminish the quality of care physicians would be
able to provide. Further, the AMA was fearful that corporations
would hinder the independent judgment of doctors by allowing lay-
people to make decisions affecting health care delivery, such as which
patients to see and the amount of services to provide. These concerns
increased the development of aspects of the profession that resembled
a guild strong on professionalism but weak on discipline.39
While the doctrine may seem too outdated to be enforced, the
statutes and regulations that form the doctrine remain in current statu-
tory compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight
stimulus to be set into action. For instance, a California court rela-
tively recently found that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine,
as manifested in that state, prohibits a hospital from employing physi-
cians, even though they may have an independent contractor relation-
ship.4° Other states have refused to eradicate the doctrine, but they
(I11. 1997) (finding that a "duly-licensed hospital possesses legislative authority to
practice medicine by means of its staff of licensed physicians and is excepted from
the operation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine"). Thus, with the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine inapplicable, the employment agreement between
the hospital and the physician was not unenforceable due to the hospital's status as a
corporate entity. Id.
38 Monnich, supra note 5, at 467-68.
39 See ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 17 (explaining that while there were many
benefits associated with small-scale guilds, they also suffered from weak budgetary
discipline).
40 Conrad v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that permitting hospitals that enter into contracts with physicians who
provide services to the public is not an exception to the ban on the corporate practice
of medicine, but rather a clarification of the practice of treating these physicians as
independent contractors). In New York, the Nutri/System corporation allegedly em-
ployed physicians on a salaried basis to conduct exams and provide medical services
for weight loss customers. The attorney general obtained a consent decree against
Nutri/System based in part on New York's version of the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine. Bd. of Tr. Comm. on Medicolegal Problems, Am. Med. Ass'n, Satellite
and Commercial Medical Clinics: Report of the Board of Trustees: Part 11, 235
JAMA 1314, 1318 (1985).
have determined that it should not apply to the employment of physi-
cians by hospitals.4 ' Still others have established that the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine will not apply to health care facilities
that are licensed by the state to deliver the medical services that their
licenses allow, for example hospitals, clinics, and (occasionally) man-
aged care entities.42 In order to understand the multi-layered status of
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine today, a review of the pro-
41 See, e.g., Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 114. But see Carter-Shields v. Alton Health
Inst., 777 N.E.2d 948, 956-58 (111. 2002) (affirming the Berlin holding, but limiting its
reach by noting that although the "prohibition against the corporate practice of medi-
cine is inapplicable 'when a corporation has been sanctioned by the laws of this state
to operate a hospital,"' this exception does not extend to unlicensed, charitable, non-
profit health organizations). The Court stated:
Our decision in Berlin stands for the proposition that the proscription
against the corporate practice of medicine is, at root, animated by the public
policy purpose of safeguarding the public health and welfare by protecting
the physician-patient relationship from lay interference with the physician's
professional judgment. The exercise of control or influence over the medi-
cal decisionmaking of a physician by a lay, unlicensed corporation results in
a division of the physician's loyalty between the often divergent interests of
the corporation and the patient. We determined in Berlin that the public pol-
icy purpose underpinning the corporate practice doctrine would not be ad-
versely affected by carving out a narrow exception for an entity, such as a
hospital, that must meet certain professional criteria established by the leg-
islature to become a licensed health-care provider. Indeed, our decision in
Berlin repeatedly emphasized the role of licensing in the genesis and
development of the corporate practice doctrine.
Id. at 957. Thus, the court found that an unlicensed, nonprofit entity was subject to
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and refused to uphold a restrictive cove-
nant between a physician and a nonprofit healthcare center (in which laypersons had
ownership interests and management power). Id. at 958.
4? See, e.g., N.J. ADMiN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-6.16(f)(4) (2003). The Code
states that a physician may be a shareholder or employee of a general business corpo-
ration if the corporation has:
a designated medical director licensed in this State who is regularly on the
premises and who ... is responsible for licensure credentialing and provi-
sion of medical services.... [And] [t]he corporation is licensed by the New
Jersey Department of Health as a health maintenance organization, hospital,
long or short-term care facility, ambulatory care facility or other type of
health care facility or health care provider.. ."
Id. See also St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 618 (Kan.
1994) (holding that a licensed hospital can provide healthcare and contract for the
service of physicians, even though an unlicensed one may not); Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3, 6-9 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that doctors and nurses in charitable hospitals are
no longer exempt from liability by claiming independent contractor status because
they are now considered an integral part of the hospital system); People v. John H.
Woodbury Dermatological Inst, 85 N.E. 697, 698-99 (N.Y. 1908) (explaining that
unlike hospitals and dispensaries who may practice through their licensed agents, a
dermatology institute was guilty of the unlawful practice of medicine for advertising
medical services without a license).
competition intervention performed by the Federal Trade Commission
nearly thirty years ago is beneficial.
1. The Federal Trade Commission Challenges the AMA
The structure and enforcement of the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine has been greatly influenced by a 1979 order of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. Though many have observed that the guild-
like nature of professional self-regulation is almost inherently anti-
competitive, the Federal Trade Commission was the first to effectively
challenge the private club that had been constructed and reinforced by
the AMA. 4  The Federal Trade Commission determined that the
AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics and the 1971 Opinions and Re-
ports were inherently anti-competitive because they prevented physi-
cians from adopting "more economically efficient business formats in
particular situations .... "" This conclusion was based upon the re-
quirements in the AMA ethical guidelines that stated such tenets as,
"[i]t is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under
conditions ...which interfere with reasonable competition among
physicians of a community" and "any insurance arrangement must be
open to all local providers. '45 It has been noted that the AMA stated
(without ir6ny) that it deliberately drafted certain ethical precepts to
prevent providers from being divided into factions that would com-
pete based on price.a6
The Federal Trade Commission further observed that the AMA's
ethical guidelines could prevent physicians from associating with
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), which had been recog-
nized and exalted by Congress as effective cost-management systems
in the HMO Act of 1973. 47 This was an unsurprising interpretation of
the AMA's requirement that all insurance companies pay for the ser-
vices of all physicians in a given geographic area in the same way.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered the AMA to modify the ethi-
cal restrictions on physicians' contractual arrangements and payment
structures so that they would comply with federal antitrust laws.
4a
43 For a thorough and classic discourse on the history of the medical profes-
sion and the guild that the AMA created for medical doctors, see PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 418-19 (1982).
44 In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1017-18 (1979).
41 Id. at 1011 n.59, 903.
46 See Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in Ameri-
can Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1356 (1984) (quot-
ing AM. MED. ASs'N, ORGAIZED PAYMENTS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES 142 (1939)).
47 Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2000) (originally enacted as the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 2, 87 Stat. 931).
48 See In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 1018. Section 6 of the 1957 Prin-
Even though the Federal Trade Commission's decision did not af-
fect state licensure laws or statutory professional guidelines, the
AMA's ethical guidelines were a cornerstone of the development of
state professional licensure law and case law, and the mandated modi-
fications to the AMA's ethical standards impacted interpretation and
enforcement of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Now, the
AMA's Code of Medical Ethics ("Code") can only reiterate the exist-
ing state prohibitions against the corporate practice of medicine,
though the AMA would have it otherwise; the Code cannot enforce
the professional autonomy of physicians and prevent them from affili-
ating with corporate entities.49 The Code now states that "[a] physi-
cian shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emer-
gencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate,
and the environment in which to provide medical services., 50 Given
the major changes in language and the attendant manifestations of
attitude, it is not surprising that some argue that the Federal Trade
Commission's order "weakens the foundation upon which the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine was built."51
Perhaps as an indirect result of the 1979 FTC order, the age-old
concerns of the AMA have come to fruition through managed care
organizations and the reimbursement system that HMOs and their
offspring have shaped. Patients who are HMO enrollees no longer
freely choose their physicians; they are limited to a panel of physi-
cians that have been contracted by the corporation that is authorized to
act as an HMO. Conversely, HMOs contractually require physicians
ciples of Medical Ethics prevented physicians from providing services under condi-
tions that might prevent the physician from exercising medical judgment with com-
plete freedom or that might deteriorate the quality of medical care. See Chase-Lubitz,
supra note 5, at 475, citing In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 896 (1979).
Though the language of the 1957 Principles of Medical Ethics was not particularly
anti-competitive, the interpretation of the section advanced by the AMA's Judicial
Council contained language that restricted practicing under a contract with any type
of corporation, prohibited lay entities from profiting in any way, declared salaried
positions in hospital emergency rooms to be unethical, and set forth a number of other
restrictions on contractual arrangements. See Id. at 476-77, citing In re American
Medical Ass 'n, 94 F.T.C. at 896-907. Thus, the Federal Trade Commission found the
AMA's restrictions had anti-competitive effects. Id.
49 See Burt Schorr, Reagan's Medicaid Plan Stirs Fears of Two-Class
Health-Care System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1981, § 2, at 29 (stating that, according to
its executive vice president, the AMA remained "violently opposed" to the removal of
guild free choice requirements in Medicaid), cited in Weller, supra note 46, at 1357
n.31.
50 AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS princ. 6, reprinted in
CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 267 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.htmi
51 Chase-Lubitz, supra note 5, at 478.
to treat any patient that is a member of that HMO, which inherently
diminishes the decision-making power and choice of physicians. 2
Further, the per member/per month payment system encourages phy-
sicians to see as many patients as possible in as little time as possible
to maximize the economies of scale.
Thus, looking only at the snapshot that HMOs provide in the
health care system, it is apparent that the AMA's initial vision has
been thwarted and that corporations have become a major part of the
practice of medicine and the provision of health care services. It is
also illuminating to consider the role of physicians in the integrated
medical care settings that exist in modem medicine.
2. An Increasingly Integrated Health Care System
The classic image of the physician with his black bag making
house calls feels as quaint as a Norman Rockwell image in the current
incarnation of the practice of medicine. Solo practitioners and small
group practices increasingly are falling by the wayside as larger group
practices and affiliations with hospitals become the norm, if for no
other reason than the need for cost savings.53 Not only has this trend
been inevitable due to economies of scale, it is also encouraged by
some of the major health care policymaking bodies today. Physicians
are just one of many categories of health care professionals, and it has
become more difficult to assert that physicians should benefit from the
guild-like protections created by the AMA. Certified registered
nurses, nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists, physician assistants,
physical therapists, chiropractors, podiatrists, occupational therapists,
and home health aides are all developing sub-professions that involve
limited licensure and fill a need in a specialty. Each one also chips
away at the central and indispensable role of the physician created by
the AMA.5
4
52 Some states have recognized that physicians have lost their voice in the
health care market and are pondering allowing physicians to form unions for the
purpose of contracting with managed care organizations. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:17B-196 (West 2003) (enacted Jan. 8, 2002) (allowing physicians to negotiate
jointly with insurance carriers). As an example of the marginalization of physicians,
the Supreme Court recently reversed the Eleventh Circuit, thus forcing physicians to
arbitrate their claims against a health maintenance organization, even though origi-
nally brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). Contractual provisions were interpreted by the Court to permit arbitration
of these claims. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 155 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2003).
This decision highlights the power imbalance between physicians and HMOs and
(perhaps) the need for physicians to act in concert in today's health care system.
53 See Jost, supra note 8, at 832.
54 See Kathleen O'Dell; System a strain for doctors going it alone, Independ-
ents say patients need choice; hospitals say they have it, NEWS LEADER, Main Sec-
Further, the provision of medical care now requires a complex
network of specialized providers, most of which are corporations,
each of which must be licensed by the state or states in which they
function to perform a particular health care service. No uniformity
exists among states for recognition of different types of corporate enti-
ties that may "practice medicine." Most health care entities are state-
licensed (though many states have abandoned certificate of need re-
quirements). Physicians and other health care practitioners must func-
tion within this network and are integral to delivery of care in each
setting.
The demise of indemnity insurance has forced physicians and
other medical care providers to think of the bottom line." Physicians
have been hauled into participation in managed care organizations, but
they are loath to continue to participate both because of the loss of
autonomy and because payments are too low to deal with the adminis-
trative burden of the 'slow-pay no-pay' game.56 Nevertheless, physi-
cians are forced to continue to participate because managed care or-
ganizations dominate health care payment markets.57 So long as this
is true, it is undeniable that corporate control, or, at least, influence, is
central to physician reimbursement and is not going to cease influenc-
ing the delivery of care in the near future.
Thus, independent medical decision-making may be a relic, not
only because of the number and variety of players in the health care
arena, but also due to the methods of reimbursement now existing. 8
Despite contractual clauses that condemn and prevent any influence
over medical decision-making by physicians, managed care organiza-
tions wield great power over the amount and level of care that is given
by virtue of their payment methodology. Capitation forces physicians
to bear the risk of providing more services to patients, whether the
tion, A, December 22, 2002 (describing the struggle certain physicians have chosen to
undertake in order to "beat the system").
"5 See, e.g., George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class
Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession's Shift
to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 775, 813-14 (2001) (discussing the
shift to managed care that resulted from escalating healthcare costs as a cause for
physicians being forced to consider finances more than they had to under true indem-
nity insurance).
56 See Sabin Russel, Doctors in State Fleeing HMOs, Consumer Advocates
Alarmed by Trend, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, February 9, 2003, at Al.
5 See Harris & Foran, supra note 55, at 817-20 (discussing the impact that
HMOs have had on modem physician practice).
58 See Jost, supra note 8, at 831 (stating that dramatic changes have occurred
in healthcare finance that have created dramatic changes in the practice of modem
medicine).
services are medically necessary or elective.59 The HMO Act of 1973
would not have been enacted if the federal government did not calcu-
late that physicians are influenced by the reimbursement they receive,
or more importantly, do not receive, for their services. While physi-
cians are now required to be the "gatekeepers" of medical care, they
are no longer the exclusive providers of patient care needs.6°
II. THE UNAVOIDABLE INFLUENCE OF PROFIT
The point is simple yet profound: everyone who works hard for
their money is influenced by financial gain, including physicians. But
the AMA created guidelines that were based in the premise that, were
it not for the undue influence of corporations and unlicensed individu-
als, physicians would be "pure" medical care providers who could
never be improperly influenced by monetary gain. Such a premise is
easily dispelled upon inspecting just one example: the federal prohibi-
tion against physician self-referral, known as the "Stark Law," and the
state laws that parallel its proscriptions. 61 Also, physicians' exodus
from participation in Medicare and Medicaid due to decreasing reim-
bursement cannot be ignored.
A.The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act
The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, commonly called the Stark
Law (named after Fortney "Pete" Stark, the Congressman who created
the statute) is a civil law that essentially sets the floor for physicians'
financial transactions insofar as physicians receive Medicare or Medi-
caid as reimbursement for the services affected by those financial rela-
tionships. The law was written to apply specifically to physicians and
59 Capitation is a payment system that HMOs created; physicians receive a
fixed amount of money per HMO member per month. This forces physicians to bear
the risk of overutilization, though many complain that capitation has lead to a system
of severe underutilization. See Gordon D. Schiff, M.D. & Quentin D. Young, M.D.,
You Can 't Leap a Chasm in Two Jumps: The Institute of Medicine Health Care Qual-
ity Report, 116 PuB. HEALTH REP. 396 (2001) (stating that capitation promotes under-
use). Even the term "medically necessary" is a loaded one due to its repeated and
denoted use in Medicare law and regulations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 139 5y(a) (2000),
which states, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, no payment
may be made under part A or part B of this subchapter for any expenses incurred for
items or services.., which.. . are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body
member .. "
60 See George P. Smith, II, Distributive Justice and Health Care, 18 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 421,424 (2002) (describing physicians as "gatekeep-
ers" in the "health care distribution industry").
61 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).
not to other health care providers. The Stark Law draws upon the
definition of physician as it is delineated in Medicare law, which in-
cludes medical doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, dentists, podiatrists,
and optometrists.
62
The body of federal proscriptions that is generically and collec-
tively referred to as the Stark Law actually consists of several statutes
and multiple regulations that, as of publishing this article, are still
being completed. The law prohibits the referral of Medicare and
Medicaid patients by a physician to an entity for the provision of cer-
tain designated health care services if the physician (or an immediate
family member) has a prohibited ownership interest in, or a compen-
sation arrangement with, the health care entity, unless an exception
applies.63 A "compensation arrangement" means any arrangement
involving any remuneration, direct or indirect, between the referring
physician and the provider; an "ownership or investment interest"
includes any kind of equity or debt arrangement. 64 The exceptions to
the Stark Law have been divided into categories that correspond to the
financial relationships: compensation arrangement exceptions, owner-
ship or investment interest exceptions, and exceptions that apply to
both compensation arrangements and ownership or investment inter-
ests.65
This is, notably, a strict liability law; a physician need not intend
to violate the Stark Law in order to violate its prohibitions. Being
close to compliance will not protect a financial arrangement; physi-
cians must comply with every element of an exception in order to be
protected from liability under the Stark Law. The implication is that
62 Id. § 1395nn(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (2000).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350-389 (2002). "Stark I" was
created in 1989, with an effective date of January 1, 1992, and prohibited referrals by
physicians for clinical laboratory services to clinical laboratories that were owned by
the referring physician. Stark I, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 1877, 103 Stat. 2236 (1989).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 added ten designated health services
to the prohibition in Stark I, thereby creating "Stark II." OBRA, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13562(h)(6), 107 Stat. 604 (1993). The regulations pertaining to Stark I were pro-
posed in 1992 and published as final regulations in 1995. Stark I Regulations, 60 Fed.
Reg. 41,914 (Aug. 14, 1995). The regulations pertaining to Stark II were published in
1998 (the "1998 Draft Regulations," 63 Fed. Reg. 1646 (Jan. 9, 1998)), and "Phase I"
of the final Stark II regulations became effective on January 4, 2002. 66 Fed. Reg.
856 (Jan. 4, 2001). Half of the 1998 Draft Regulations became effective on January
4, 2002. Id. The Stark II Phase II regulations were published in the spring of 2004,
and as of the publication of this article, their meaning was still being deciphered. See
66 Fed. Reg. 17933 (April 6, 2004). Physicians (or their attorneys) still rely on the
preamble and other language from the 1998 Draft Regulations to decipher elements of
the Stark Law.
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(a)(2), 1395nn(h)(1) (2000).
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)-(e) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350-389.
no amount of good intent can compensate for the inherent wrong of
physicians referring to themselves for patients' care and the improper
financial gain that they receive from such self-referring.66 Further, the
Stark Law, unlike other fraud prevention statutes (like the federal anti-
kickback statute, which applies to all health care providers that accept
Medicare and/or Medicaid and anyone else involved in the fraud), was
designed to apply only to physicians.67 The mere fact that physicians'
compliance with the Stark Law is mandatory shows nothing if not
distrust of the financial motives of physicians.68
In addition to the federal proscriptions, many states have laws
forbidding fee-splitting, meaning that physicians cannot pay for refer-
rals or receive remuneration for providing certain services or items.69
66 See generally Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of
Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Service
Characteristics, 268 JAMA 2055 (1992). The authors of this article were commis-
sioned by the Florida legislature to study physicians who held interests in "joint ven-
tures," meaning an ownership or investment interest between a referring physician
and freestanding entities that provided physical therapy services. Mitchell and Scott
found that physicians in Florida who held interests in joint ventures had higher utili-
zation rates, charges per patient, and profits, but that the same physicians hired fewer
licensed therapists and the licensed therapists spent less time with each patient. Id. at
2057-59. See also TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, THE LAW OF
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 214-18 (2002) (describing the reasons
that the Stark law was implemented, including fears of overutilization, improper
motivation for profit-making, decreased quality of care, and unnecessary medical
services).
67 But see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000). The federal anti-kickback statute
makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive any remu-
neration to induce the referral of business for which payment may be made by a fed-
eral health care program. The statute has been interpreted to cover any arrangement
where one purpose of the solicitation was to obtain remuneration in return for a refer-
ral of services, or one purpose of the payment was to induce further referrals. United
States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985). Violation of the statute constitutes a felony punishable by
a fine of up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years, exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid, and administrative sanctions. Importantly, however, the
anti-kickback statute contains a mens rea element that the Stark Law lacks. To avoid
criminal liability, a healthcare provider need only voluntarily comply with a statutory
or regulatory safe harbor. Further, even without safe harbor compliance, the govern-
ment must show that the defendant had the requisite intent to violate the statute.
Thus, in many ways, the law that applies to physicians only is a more difficult law
with which to comply and a harsher method of reducing health care fraud.
68 See generally Thomas S. Crane et al., Phase I of Stark H Final Rule Analy-
sis; Phase H Release Date Uncertain, 10 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 193 (Feb. 1, 2001)
(providing an overview of the issues raised in the Stark Law and final rule).
69See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-24-360(10) (2002); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 §
35-6.17(c) (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-15(D)(16) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2002)
(repealed effective July 1, 2004); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509-a (McKinney 2001); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.1(b)(4) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
Such laws apply to all physician activities, regardless of the source of
reimbursement, because they are part of the statutory licensure struc-
ture for physicians and other professionals. Some of these laws
closely follow the language of the federal anti-kickback statute and
Stark Law, while other states' statutes contain different language that
can be broader and more encompassing than the federal prohibitions.70
The basic prohibition is the same, however: physicians cannot pay
other physicians for referring patients, and non-licensed individuals or
entities cannot share in the professional fees generated by physicians.
The state laws have some similarities in penalties, such as imposition
of civil fines and penalties; criminal penalties; and actions against the
licensee such as revocation of the license, fines, censure, or repri-
mand, any of which may be imposed if fee-splitting has occurred.7' In
addition to the statutory prohibitions, many professional associations
for physicians prohibit fee-splitting in their membership codes of con-
duct, and expulsion may result if fee-splitting occurs.72
The fee-splitting laws also prohibit sharing reimbursement from
professional services with an unlicensed person or entity, which is tied
into the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Again, the pretense
is that physicians would not be motivated by money if it were not for
the improper influence of non-physicians, whether individuals or cor-
porations, because they do not answer to the state. If corporate influ-
ence were the only issue, however, there would be no reason to pro-
hibit self-referral if physicians would not otherwise be influenced by
financial gain.
1354(12) (Supp. 2003).
70 Some states have been waiting for the Stark regulations to be finalized so
that they can modify and align their statutory schemes to mirror the federal laws.
71 See statutes listed supra note 69. Fee-splitting can also trigger the federal
anti-kickback statute and the Stark Law, depending on the scheme and the reim-
bursement that is the subject of the fee-splitting. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b); 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn.
72 The American College of Surgeons forbids its members to split fees. The
Statements on Principles mandate, "[flee splitting as an inducement to refer a patient
to another physician is unethical. The premise for referral must be quality of care.
Violation of this tenet disqualifies an applicant. If a surgeon who is already a Fellow
violates this principle, it is a cause for expulsion from Fellowship." AM. COLL.
SURGEONS, STATEMENTS ON PRINCIPLES, princ. Ill(C), available at
http://www.facs.org/fellowsinfo/statements/stonprin.html (last modified Oct. 1997).
In fact, the membership oath requires surgeons to denounce fee-splitting. AM. COLL.
SURGEONS, Fellowship Pledge, available at
http://www.facs.org/memberservices/2bfacs.html (last modified Aug. 19, 2002).
B. Further Evidence:
Decreasing Participation in Medicare and Medicaid
Evidence that is becoming less anecdotal and more statistical
shows that physicians are rejecting participation in Medicare and
Medicaid (though exodus from Medicaid is not new because reim-
bursement rates are notoriously low) not only due to the administra-
tive hassles, but also because of impossibly low, and decreasing, re-
imbursement rates.73 Hospitals and other health care providers are
73 Bleak Outlook: Physician Executives Nationwide Reconsider Medicare
Participation, MODERN PHYSICIAN, Jan. 1, 2003, at 12 (noting that physicians are
being forced to drop Medicare participation due to yearly cuts in reimbursement rates
and escalating costs of health care services). The article in Modem Physician re-
counts the following dialogue:
Thomas Scully, the CMS administrator, tells Modem Physician his agency
has not yet noted a decline in the number of physicians participating in
Medicare, but he believes one is coming.
"My guess is once they take a 4.4% reduction, we're going to see a large
wave of very upset doctors" Scully says. "I hope doctors will stay in, be-
cause I think Congress will fix it. But they have every right in the world to
be angry."
Scully says CMS has scrubbed the payment formula and made every ad-
justment it could, noting that the original cut planned for 2003 was 5.7%
rather than 4.4%.
"I've done back flips to try and find a way to not do this," he says. "When
we started talking to doctors' groups a year ago, the cuts were even bigger.
I'm sure the AMA would argue we could do more, but we've pushed it as
far as we can."
The figures are alarming, but the stories behind them are not mere hyperbole. Com-
munity doctors-generalists and specialists, rural and urban, in practices large and
small-who make up the raw numbers of physicians contemplating dramatic action,
will spend the coming year trying to keep their doors open and halt the downward
financial spiral.
Id. See also Barbara Martinez, Some Doctors Say They May Stop Seeing Medicare
Patients After Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at B1 (referencing both anecdotal and
statistical evidence of doctors who considered ending their participation in the Medi-
care program because of reduced reimbursement); Politics & Policy Medicare: AM4
Says Scheduled Cuts Would Harm Access to Care, AM. POLIcAL NETWORK-AM.
HEALTH LINE, Oct. 16, 2002; Kim Norris, Doctors Warn of Medicare Cutbacks: AMA
Says Patients Might Be Dropped IfAid Dries Up, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 16,
2002, at 1D (explaining that nearly half of doctors surveyed by the American Medical
Association considered leaving the Medicare program, and nearly one quarter have
limited or are planning to limit their participation); Jennifer Silverman, Next Medicare
Cut: 40% of Doctors May Opt Out: Pay Set to Drop 4.4% Further, FAM. PRACTICE
NEWS, October 15, 2002. This exodus from federal health care programs may be
temporarily thwarted due to the slight increase that Congress mandated after the De-
partment of Health and Human Services ("HHS") determined that it could not avoid a
decrease due to its statutory mandate. The statutory mandate was modified by the
Medicare Modernization Act, which created a 1.5% increase in payment for 2004 and
2005. See Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 601 (2003), 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
also opting not to participate in Medicare or Medicaid, especially so-
called "boutique" outpatient facilities.74 Even the Mayo Clinic has
decided it will no longer accept assignment of Medicare reimburse-
ment and will become a non-participating provider.75  Non-
participation is different than opting out of Medicare, a formal process
by which the physician agrees to totally reject Medicare reimburse-
ment for a period of two years and that allows the physician to be re-
imbursed only by a private contract between the physician and the
patient. Opting out is still rather rare. Non-participation is no longer
unusual, though, as it forces the physician to receive lower Medicare
reimbursement but allows the physician to "balance-bill" the patient,
which is otherwise prohibited.76
A recent on-line survey by the AMA found that 48% of the physi-
cians surveyed either have limited the number of Medicare patients
they will see or plan to impose limits soon due to the decreasing reim-
bursement rates for physicians. 77 Further, 61% of primary care physi-
cians and 44% of specialists surveyed stated that they would be forced
to place limitations on the number of Medicare patients that they treat
due to the planned cuts in physician reimbursement rates by Medi-
care. 78 While this trend was stemmed by the emergency increase in
physician reimbursement rates, the informal poll was telling. Physi-
cians recognize that the business of medicine is changing, but the
problem is that the need for medical care is unchanging.
79
74 See Adrian E. Hirsch, The Search for Nurses, THE GREATER BATON ROUGE
Bus. REP., Jan. 7, 2003, at 44, 45 (reporting that hospitals that choose not to partici-
pate in Medicare and Medicaid have greater flexibility in compensation packages and
less paperwork, giving them competitive advantages).
75 Sarah Skidmore, Ready or Not, Patients Take on Medicare from Mayo:
Mayo Clinic's Medicare Status Changes Tomorrow, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 3 1,
2002, at El; see also Medicare Rates Won't Meet Costs, HMOs Say, WASH. POST,
Jan. 18, 2002, at A4 (describing the trend of managed care plans leaving the Medicare
program due to insufficient government payments).
76 Generally, participating physicians cannot obtain payment from Medicare
patients except for the requisite co-payment or deductible. Otherwise, participating
physicians must accept the Medicare calculus for payment, which is generally lower
than the physician's actual cost of providing care. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)
(2000).
77 AM. MED. ASS'N, NEW AMA SURVEY -- ABOUT HALF OF PHYSICIANS WILL
LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MEDICARE PATIENTS THEY TREAT IN 2003 (describing the sig-
nificant number of physicians limiting the number of patients they see, because of
government payment cuts), at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-
7207.html (Jan. 23, 2003).
78 See Half of Surveyed Doctors to Limit Medicare Patients, 12 HEALTH L.
REP. (BNA) 169 (Jan. 30, 2003) (reporting the results of an online survey by the
AMA).
79 See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, THE BUSINESS OF MEDICINE: A COLORADO
CARDIOLOGIST SPEAKS OUT ABOUT MEDICARE, MEMBERSHIP AND MORE (discussing the
Such dramatic reactions were temporarily alleviated by House
Joint Resolution 2, which prevented further reductions in Medicaid
reimbursement for physicians, and by the Medicare Modernization
Act, which gave physicians an increase in reimbursement for 2004
and 2005 rather than the usual yearly decrease. 80  These measures
only place a tiny bandage on the gaping wound, however, because the
rate of reimbursement simply has not increased at the pace that the
cost of medical care has risen.81 In fact, despite the increase in reim-
bursement that Congress pushed through for this calendar year, the
update must be maintained and projected forward in order to prevent a
boomerang decrease in physician payments in 2006 and 2007 that will
result from the immediate increases in reimbursement. 82  Because
financial concerns are an on-going issue, and because of the limita-
tions placed on their financial relationships with other health care pro-
viders, physicians will have to continue to find ways to cut comers
and cut costs.
The undeniable conclusion is that physicians, regardless of
strenuous objections to the contrary, are influenced by financial gain.
Allowing them to be engaged by corporations that are not per se li-
censed to practice medicine would not change this fact. On the other
hand, limiting the corporate practice of medicine doctrine's reach
could help to advance the effort to improve quality of care.
difficulties that doctors face in caring for patients amidst rising health care costs), at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/3216-7144.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2003).
80 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 3 Division G, 117 Stat. 11 (2003) (allocat-
ing funds to the states under the Social Security Act for unanticipated costs for Medi-
caid). The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act insti-
tuted a 1.5 % increase rather than a 4.4% decrease. See Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 601
(2003), 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
81 This is accepted as a true statement for all types of health care providers,
not just physicians. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good Reas-
sessing the Scope ofDirectors' Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations
with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 409, 417-18 (2002)
(discussing the decline in reimbursement as a significant force behind the conversion
of hospitals to for-profit). See also Miriam L. Clemons, Don't Shoot the Messenger:
Independent Physicians and Joint Payment Contracting Using the Messenger Model,
32 U. MEM. L. REv. 927, 933-34 (2002) (citing falling reimbursement as a cause for
the failure of physician practice integration, and thus as a means to counteract the
decline through collective bargaining).
82 See Markian Hawryluk, Physicians Fight to Preserve Pay Increase in
Medicare Bill, A.M. NEws, July 14, 2003 (noting a view that increased reimburse-
ment is key to ensuring patients' access to physicians who serve the Medicare popula-
tion), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/07/14/gvl 10714.htm.
III. NEUTRAL TO NEGATIVE IMPACT ON QUALITY
OF CARE
It is important to understand the ways in which the corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine is not just outdated but also potentially dam-
aging to the development and growth of health care delivery systems.
This section will discuss three areas that demonstrate the ways in
which the doctrine impacts on larger, national health care issues.
First, the Institute of Medicine has written three reports that provide
support for rethinking the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
within the context of overhauling the system of American health care
delivery. Second, within the important and highly publicized topic of
fraud and abuse prevention, the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of the Inspector General (the "OIG") has recognized
the need for all health care providers to cooperate as part of an inter-
connected system. Third, medical malpractice law and general tort
law theory have been evolving in a direction that ties physician liabil-
ity to the oversight and responsibility of hospitals. Each of these de-
velopments strongly suggests that unification, not division, is the fu-
ture of health care delivery and development.
A. Institute of Medicine Reports
The Institute of Medicine (the "IOM") was established by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (the "NAS") to secure the services of
eminent members of relevant professions to examine public health
policy matters, and it acts under the authority given to the NAS by its
Congressional charter to identify issues of medical care, research, and
education.83 As such, the IOM is considered a knowledgeable and
unbiased source of information (and perhaps illumination) for many
issues in the health care system.84 Two recent monographs issued by
the IOM, To Err Is Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm, and their
follow-up reports, have been the subject of much press due to their
dire descriptions of the quality of American health care and the num-
ber of medical errors that occur in the American health care system.
While the two reports do not directly address the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine, they provide strong support for rethinking the cor-
porate practice of medicine doctrine due to the suggestions they make
83 See INST. OF MED., at http://www.iom.edu/about.asp (last visited Feb. 21,
2004) (describing the formation and mission of the Institute of Medicine of the Na-
tional Academies).
84 See INST. OF MED., MORE ABOUT THE INST. OF MED., at
http://www.iom.edu/subpage.asp?id=4091 (last visited Feb. 21, 2004) (describing the
characteristics of the Institute and the nature of its work).
for unifying and strengthening the "systems" of American health care
delivery.
1. To Err Is Human
The focus of this monograph is patient safety.85 The IOM advo-
cates moving away from placing blame on individuals for lapses in
medical care and moving toward a "systems" approach in order to
modify the conditions that contribute to errors. 86 The IOM notes that
the safety problem does not result from bad people, it results from a
faulty health care system. 87 Thus, the IOM concludes that the system
itself must be made safer by ensuring quality from the top down.88
This means instituting error-free systems at the highest level and inte-
grating efforts of all health care providers, whether corporations or
individuals. For instance, the IOM suggests that health care organiza-
tions implement interdisciplinary educational programs to reduce er-
rors so that all personnel, from the highest level of professional to the
least skilled staff member, understand how to work as part of the
whole to effectuate better treatment for the patient.89 Such a recom-
mendation recognizes the interconnectedness of health care delivery
and does not allow for artificial barriers to patient care.
The point is further reinforced when the IOM describes that errors
occur in all health care settings, but more often than not, an institution
is involved.90 Thus, system-wide efforts are necessary to make health
care an error-free proposition.91 The IOM makes the point that all of
health care delivery, at every level of operation, from the microcosm
of the operating room to the larger multi-hospital corporate conglom-
erate, is a system.92 Because the IOM focuses on patient safety as
85 William C. Richardson, Preface to COMM. ON QUALIFY OF HEALTH CARE
IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM, at ix-x
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter To ERR Is HUMAN].
86 See id. at 156-57, 166-69, 173-74.
87 Id. at 49, 169.
88 Id. at 156-57.
89 id.
90 This idea had been discussed before the IOM issued To ERR Is HUMAN.
See, e.g., Jost, supra note 8, at 845 (stating that error is "inevitable and ubiquitous"
and therefore cannot be eradicated by regulation alone).
9' See id. at 849-67. See also To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 83, at 49-68.
92 In discussing why errors occur, the monograph notes,
Systems can be very large and far-reaching, or they can be more localized.
In health care, a system can be an integrated delivery system, a centrally
owned multihospital system, or a virtual system comprised of many differ-
ent partners over a wide geographic area. However, an operating room or
an obstetrical unit is also a type of system. Furthermore, any element in a
system probably belongs to multiple systems. For example, one operating
"freedom from accidental injury," a patient-based perspective on
medical errors, the IOM can see the health care delivery system from
a different perspective than those who are constantly mired in its intri-
cacies. 93 And what the IOM sees is the need for a combined effort.
Thus, the IOM recommends that health care entities and the phy-
sicians and other professionals affiliated with them make continually-
improved patient safety a conscious goal through establishing patient
safety programs that include, among other things, interdisciplinary,
team-oriented training programs that incorporate proven methods of
team management. 94 The IOM specifically recommends that report-
ing and analysis methods be developed within organizations so that
safety can be part of the system, and it strongly recommends against
blaming individuals.95
The fundamental concept is that health care providers must work
as a multidisciplinary unit, as part of a whole system, in order to ef-
fectuate change toward safer health care delivery. Nowhere did the
IOM encourage physicians to act as independent individuals who
should reject the influence of corporations; in fact, the corporate struc-
ture is viewed as an important element in the systems-based approach
96that the IOM adopts. It is an approach that has had proven results in
other industries, and the IOM makes a strong argument for systems-
based operations in health care as well.97 Integration, not individual,
is the key to the IOM's analysis, the antithesis of the foundation of the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
2. Crossing the Quality Chasm
In a related study, the IOM discussed more broadly how the
health care delivery system can be redesigned in order to innovate and
room is part of a surgical department, which is part of a hospital, which is
part of a larger health care delivery system .... When large systems fail, it
is due to multiple faults that occur together in an unanticipated interaction,
creating a chain of events in which the faults grow and evolve.
Id. at 52.
93 See id. at 57-58 (explaining that, although others may define patient safety
as a relative concept, the absolute capability of the system to permit safe care is para-
mount).
94 Id. at 156, 173-74.
9' Id. at 156-57 (stating that the majority of errors are not reported due to
individuals' fear of punishment).
96 See id. at 165-69. See also Jost, supra note 8, at 838 (observing that ad-
vances in technology and general industry reorganization have made it possible for
non-professional managers to oversee the provision of health care in a way that pro-
motes quality of care).
97 See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 85, at 159-62 (discussing the utility of
safety systems in high risk industries such as chemical processing and mining).
improve care. Crossing the Quality Chasm articulated the goal of
building a stronger, higher-quality health care system capable of de-
98livering modem health care to all Americans. Part of the agenda for
achieving that goal, according to the 1OM, requires cooperation
among clinicians, meaning that "[c]linicians and institutions should
actively collaborate and communicate to ensure an appropriate ex-
change of information and coordination of care." 99 As with the sug-
gestions in To Err Is Human, it is clear that the health care delivery
system envisioned by the IOM is one of increased integration.'00 The
IOM asserts that the new paradigm must go beyond "prerogatives and
roles" to embrace "good communication among members of a team,
using all the expertise and knowledge of team members and... sensi-
bly extending roles to meet patients' needs.''
ra
The IOM also recognizes that all currently-existing payment
methods affect behavior and quality of care. 0 2 For instance, while
fee-for-service reimbursement raises concerns about overuse, capita-
tion payments raise concerns about under-use. Essentially, the IOM
argues that no current payment method properly aligns financial in-
98 COMM. ON QuALrrY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING
THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2001) [here-
inafter CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM].
99 Id. at 8-9. This is just one part of the ambitious agenda set forth by the
IOM. The agenda also includes such goals as:
* That all health care constituencies, including policymakers, purchasers,
regulators, health professionals, health care trustees and management, and
consumers, commit to a national statement of purpose for the health care
system as a whole and to a shared agenda of six aims for improvement that
can raise the quality of care to unprecedented levels.
* That clinicians and patients, and the health care organizations that sup-
port care delivery, adopt a new set of principles to guide the redesign of
care processes....
* That health care organizations design and implement more effective or-
ganizational support processes to make change in the delivery of care pos-
sible....
Id. at 5 (showing that increased integration and cooperative functioning are integral to
the IOM's vision of improved healthcare delivery).
I0' See id. at 28, 138-39 (arguing that the current health care delivery system
is both decentralized and poorly organized, and requires collaboration and interde-
pendence to promote safety and quality). The IOM notes that the current structure of
the health care system rewards individual competence and "protect[s] professional
prerogatives and separate roles," whereas the system should reward "cooperation and
teamwork," and thereby discourage the establishment of individual fiefdoms. Id. at
83.
1on Id. (citing Roger J. Bulger, The Quest for the Therapeutic Organization,
283 JAMA 2431 (2000)) (discussing the benefits of a team-based approach to health
care).
102 Id. at 17.
centives with the goal of quality improvement, and, accordingly, all
health care reimbursement systems should be re-examined. 10 3 These
observations comport with the assertions in this article that, despite
the AMA's protests, physicians (and all health care providers) are
influenced by financial gain or loss. The IOM makes a strong point
that current payment policies should be wholly revised to positively
influence health care providers in order to "align[]... payment incen-
tives with quality improvement."''0 4 It is an important observation
because not all financial influence is inherently malevolent. Properly
aligned, physicians and corporate entities have the potential to posi-
tively affect patient care.
The alignment of incentives is also important, according to the
IOM, because the current health care system is too decentralized and
too complex for patients to navigate.'15 The study shows that health
care delivery processes are complex and lack fluidity, requiring a va-
riety of "handoffs" that slow down the process of providing care and
that decrease safety. 1' 6 According to the IOM, health care should be
seamless; services should be provided as part of a unified whole
where information and technology are available in all parts of the
chain of care. 10 7 If the current prohibitions against corporate practice
of medicine are allowed to stand, the envisioned "chain of care" will
be virtually impossible to achieve.
Nowhere does the IOM suggest that doctors should function as
solitary islands in the stream of health care. In both To Err Is Human
and Crossing the Quality Chasm, physicians are expected to work as a
cog in the wheel of an interconnected, interactive health care delivery
system. Further, corporations are regarded as an inevitable part of the
health care delivery system. The IOM consistently expresses that
103 Id. at 17-19. The IOM observes,
All payment methods affect behavior and quality. For example, fee-for-
service payment methods for physicians and hospitals raise concerns about
potential overuse of services-the provision of services that may not be
necessary or may expose the patient to greater potential harm than benefit.
On the other hand, capitation and per case payment methods for physicians
and hospitals raise questions about potential underuse-the failure to pro-
vide services from which the patient would likely benefit. Indeed, no pay-
ment method perfectly aligns financial incentives with the goal of quality
improvement for all health care decision makers, including clinicians, hos-
pitals, and patients.
Id. at 17.
'04 Id. at 17-19.
105 See generally id. at 28-29.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 47 (discussing the importance of evidence-based practice, which
requires the clinician to integrate scientific information with clinical expertise).
concern should focus on accountability at all levels for quality and
safety of care, regardless of corporate structure or governance.
The IOM followed-up on To Err Is Human and Crossing the
Quality Chasm in a third report on quality of health care in America
entitled Leadership by Example: Coordinating Government Roles in
Improving Health Care Quality.08  Congress specifically commis-
sioned the IOM to analyze the quality of care and potential for im-
provement in six government-sponsored health care programs, includ-
ing Medicare and Medicaid. The IOM determined that improving
quality of care in the six studied programs would force improvements
in the entire health care system because, together, the programs treat
approximately 100 million Americans. Leadership by Example chal-
lenges the federal government to set the quality standard for the health
care industry by rewarding improvements in quality, using health care
delivery systems as models for integrating care, and increasing re-
search and applying its results to improve quality of care.!°9 Once
again, the IOM encourages more active integration of health care de-
livery systems to improve quality of care.
B. Other Governmental Guidance
Similar ideas have been expressed in other important health care
industry guidance, such as the OIG's guidance for physician corporate
compliance plans.'1 The OIG is the federal agency that interprets and
enforces the anti-kickback statute and other health care fraud and
abuse laws through such mechanisms as Advisory Opinions, Special
Fraud Alerts, and guidance for corporate compliance plans for differ-
ent types of health care entities."' In the guidance for physician
group practices, the OIG suggests strongly that physicians work with
larger institutions on their corporate compliance plans to take advan-
tage of economies of scale.1 2 In its press release, the OIG wrote that
108 COMM. ON ENHANCING FEDERAL HEALTH CARE QUALITY PROGRAMS, INST.
OF MED., LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GOVERNMENT ROLES IN
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309086183/html/ [hereinafter LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE].
109 See id. at 1.
110 See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health and Human Services, OIG
Compliance Program for Individual and Small Group Physician Practices, 65 Fed.
Reg. 59434 (October 5, 2000), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/physician.pdf.
111 See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, at http://oig.hhs.gov.
112 The OIG acknowledged the importance of collaboration, while recogniz-
ing the potential for remuneration presented by physician participation with larger
entities, by stating:
it "encourages physician practices to participate in the compliance
programs of other providers, such as hospitals or other settings in
which the physicians practice. A physician practice's participation in
such compliance programs could be a way, at least partly, to augment
the practice's own compliance efforts."'" 3  Thus, despite concerns
about the potential for improper remuneration, the OIG recognizes the
need for health care providers to work as part of an interconnected
system. 14 This OIG guidance pre-dated the IOM reports on health
care quality, but the two dovetail and lead to similar conclusions that
physicians must be permitted to fully integrate in order to function in
the current health care market.
Economies of scale and common learning about corporate com-
pliance and other issues can drive the effort for greater quality of care
and efficiency in communication. If states continue to interpret licen-
sure laws to prevent formal or informal associations between hospitals
(and other corporate health care entities) and physicians, however,
such efforts will never leave the ground. Increased emphasis on en-
terprise liability and enterprise responsibility further augment the po-
sition that the physician cannot operate as a stand-alone health care
provider in modem health care delivery.
C. Further Evidence: Movement toward Entity Liability and Entity
Responsibility
Tort law has been evolving in a manner that also suggests in-
creased integration of the delivery of health care and that ties physi-
cian services to the corporate control of hospitals and other entities." 5
By example, vicarious negligence has been accepted as a theory of
The OIG encourages... collaborative effort, where the content is appropri-
ate to the setting involved (i.e., the training is relevant to physician practices
as well as the sponsoring provider), because it provides a means to promote
the desired objective .... However, to prevent possible anti-kickback or
self-referral issues, the OIG recommends that physicians consider limiting
their participation in a sponsoring provider's compliance program to the ar-
eas of training and education or policies and procedures.
OIG Compliance Program for Individual and Small Group Physician Practices, 65
Fed. Reg. at 59437.
3 Office of Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health and Human Services, News
Release: Inspector General Issues Voluntary Compliance Program Guidance for
Physician Practices (Sept. 25, 2000), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/press/phycomp.htm.
114 See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
115 As recently as the 1950s, the doctrine of charitable immunity was applied
to hospitals, exempting them from liability. But cf. Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9
(N.Y. 1957) (noting that the rule of non-liability is "out of tune" with modem needs
and declaring hospitals subject to the same rules of liability as all employers).
hospital liability through the premises of ostensible agency and appar-
ent authority, regardless of the employment status of the offending
physician (employee or independent contractor)." 6 Similarly, hospi-
tals have been held liable for patients' injuries when they have failed
to credential and/or supervise physicians properly, and when they
have failed to ensure that facilities and equipment necessary for pa-
tient care are reasonably available." 17 The American Law Institute
historically has suggested that exclusive hospital liability would be
more efficient and promote quality better when a physician negli-
gently causes medical injury in a hospital; but this is an unpopular
theory because it includes absolving physicians from legal liability." 8
While the purpose of this article is not to advocate for entity li-
ability, the movement toward modifying tort liability in this way pro-
vides a notable example of the ways in which physicians are no longer
independent in providing health care services and how their profes-
sional fate is tied to the environment in which they practice. Even
when the relationship is merely one of independent contractor (not
employee), hospitals have been found to be responsible for the actions
of physicians in their facilities. Hospitals provide quality assurance
mechanisms, utilization review mechanisms, and systems for tracking
patient care that are fundamental to many physicians' (and other
health care professionals') areas of specialty. In addition to medical
staff bylaws, which create a standard of care of sorts for physicians on
the medical staff, hospitals often have internal quality assurance
manuals and safety standards by virtue of state law, to which physi-
cians and other health care professionals must adhere in order to pro-
vide services in the hospital.19 It would seem to be absurd to deter-
116 See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hosp., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 150-52 (Ind. 1999)
(holding that the hospital was liable for the negligent acts of an independent con-
tracted anesthesiologist); Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (I11. App. Ct.
1998) (stating that under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be vicari-
ously liable for the negligent acts of a physician regardless of that physician's em-
ployment status); White v. Methodist Hosp. South, 844 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1992) (allowing for the possibility that anesthesiology staff might be liable as
apparent agents of the hospital).
117 See, e.g., Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181-83
(D.C. 1990) (holding that the hospital was liable for injuries resulting from a lack of
appropriate blood monitoring equipment that was standard in other hospitals at the
time of the injury); Bellamy v. Appellate Dept., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 896-97 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (permitting a claim against a hospital for professional negligence).
118 AM. L. INST., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY VOL. II 113 (1991) (describing the then-current institutional frame-
work for dealing with personal injuries and analyzing potential approaches to legal
and institutional change to place tort liability at a higher level of responsibility).
119 See generally ALA. CODE § 22-21-8 (1997) (incentivizing internal quality
insurance mechanisms by protecting them from discovery in civil lawsuits); ARK.
mine that physicians cannot be held to these standards simply because
hospitals are corporations, and yet, courts have negated contracts on
similar theories.12
0
Further, hospitals directly organize and deliver health care on a
daily basis, and they necessarily exercise close control over profes-
sional conduct, facilities, supplies, and bureaucratic procedures. Due
to accreditation by such entities as the Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO"),121 hospitals have been
responsible for pursuing formal programs of institutional quality im-
provement, which necessarily requires the cooperation of the profes-
sionals who work in hospitals. 122 JCAHO explains its purpose as fol-
lows, "JCAHO has been accrediting hospitals for over 50 years ....
JCAHO accreditation is a nationwide seal of approval that indicates
organizations meet high performance standards. Our accreditation
helps organizations improve their performance, raise the level of pa-
tient care, and demonstrate accountability in the rapidly changing
health care marketplace."' 23 JCAHO accreditation standards include
such areas as emergency management planning, environment of care
standards, medical staff standards, and patient safety standards and
goals.
124
Recognizing the need for hospitals to take a proactive, rather than
reactive, stance on patient quality of care, JCAHO has recently cre-
ated new standards for hospitals that go beyond reporting sentinel
CODE ANN. § 23-76-108 (Lexis 1999) (mandating that the health care organizations
maintain ongoing health care assurance program).
120 For instance, hospitals have successfully defended against physicians'
medical malpractice by asserting the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. See,
e.g., Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (Colo. 1944) (noting that a hospital cannot
be responsible for a physician's discharge of its professional duty). More recently,
however, state courts have found that hospitals do have duties to adequately creden-
tial medical staff, ensure that they are appropriately monitored, and to uphold a proper
standard of care in the hospital. See generally Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d
703, 707 (Pa. 1991); Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 318-20
(2000).
121 See generally JOINT CoMMIssION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGANIzATIoNs, at http://www.jcaho.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
122 Hospitals have long been involved in quality control through the mecha-
nisms of "continuous quality improvement" and "total quality management," ideas
that have been applied not only in the healthcare setting but also throughout industry
in the United States and Japan. See Jost, supra note 8, at 838.
123 JCAHO, HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION, at
http://www.jcaho.org/htba/hospitals/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
124 See JCAHO, STANDARDS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (CAMH), at
http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/hospitals/standards/hospital+faqs/inde
x.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
events 125 and place the emphasis on teamwork and "effective commu-
nications among responsible care-givers" in order to prevent break-
downs in patient safety and quality of care.126 Interestingly, in dis-
cussing the goals of improving quality of care, the president of
JCAHO noted that professionals in the United States are trained to
function as individuals in making day-to-day medical decisions, and
that is no longer enough. The president cautioned that health care
professionals need to be trained in "systems thinking and analysis"
and noted that medical professionals now need to be trained "as inter-
disciplinary teams.' 27
Hospitals have taken the lead in quality of care issues, which is
important for (at least) two reasons. First, it indicates recognition of
the natural leadership role that hospitals, as some of the largest corpo-
rate health care entities, have in the American health care system.
Despite the development of ambulatory surgery centers, clinics, and
other sites of medical services, hospitals remain a hub in the wheel of
health care. Even when physicians have competing interests in outpa-
tient surgery centers, they must, as a practical matter, maintain staff
privileges for in-patient procedures. 28 This was the thrust of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois' decision in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln
Medical Center.'29 The Berlin court determined, given the way that
health care delivery has developed (including the propagation of
HMOs, employment of physicians by hospitals, and introduction of
for-profit entities into health care delivery in general), that the public
policy concerns that created the corporate practice of medicine doc-
125 The "sentinel event" reporting system was developed by JCAHO as a way
to monitor serious errors or events that are detrimental to patient health and/or quality
of care in the hospital setting through a system of self-reporting by hospitals. Report-
able sentinel events include unanticipated patient death or permanent loss of function.
The sentinel event system was launched in 1996, but JCAHO realized that the reac-
tive system was not sufficient. See Reducing Medical Errors: A Review of Innovative
Strategies to Improve Patient Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 24-28 (2002) (statement of
Dennis S. O'Leary, President, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations), available at
http://www.jcaho.org/news+roon/on+capitol+hill/olearytest.htm.
126 Id. at 26.
127 Id. at 28.
128 Interestingly, some hospitals have been denying staff privileges to physi-
cians who hold investment interests in competing ambulatory surgery centers and
specialty hospitals. See Reed Abelson, Hospitals Battle For-Profit Groups for Pa-
tients, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Cl. The OIG has solicited commentary on this
recent development in the ever-evolving relationship between hospitals and health
care professionals. See Solicitation of New Safe Harbors and Special Fraud Alerts,
67 Fed. Reg. 72894-95 (proposed Dec. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
129 688 N.E.2d 106, 113-14 (Ill. 1997).
trine should be inapplicable to licensed hospitals. The court found
particularly influential a statement by the Kansas Supreme Court that
"[i]t would be incongruous to conclude that the legislature intended a
hospital to accomplish what it is licensed to do without utilizing phy-
sicians as independent contractors or employees .... To conclude
that a hospital must do so without employing physicians is not only
illogical but ignores reality."' 30 The symbiotic relationships that exist
today cannot be ignored and should not be limited by outdated doc-
trine.
Second, hospitals' leadership role in quality improvement indi-
cates a willingness to work with other health care professionals to
modify the current deficiencies in delivery of care, which should be
encouraged, not blocked. In this regard, the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine can do nothing but stand in the way of increased
quality of care. This is not to say that we should attempt to integrate
hospitals and physician groups, a trend that appears to have failed in
the 1990's.13' But we have seen that state courts are unwilling to to-
tally eradicate the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, even when
they are willing to limit its reach in obvious circumstances.
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The unfortunate result of states' failure to see past their limited
usefulness in licensure of health care professionals is that quality of
care, increased cooperation and coordination in delivery of care, and
general principles of equity will continue to suffer. Thus, this article
attempts to provide a tenable solution to the discord created by state
law in the form of federal legislation.
IV. PROPOSAL: FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In the interest of continuing to ensure that physicians can make
medically independent decisions, but also recognizing the escalating
costs of health care in the United States and the need to function with
130 688 N.E. 2d at 114, quoting St. Francis Reg'I Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d
606, 618 (1994).
131 BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 878 (4th ed. 2001) (describing the failed efforts at integration and the
dramatic failures of large systems that aggressively expanded).
132 For instance, as was discussed above, even though Illinois notoriously
rejected the corporate practice of medicine doctrine for state-licensed healthcare enti-
ties in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Medical Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997), Illinois
courts refused to extend the exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
created in Berlin to nonprofit entities that were not licensed by the state. See, e.g.,
Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 777 N.E.2d 948, 958-59 (Ill. 2002) (invalidating
a contract between a physician and a nonprofit corporation because the nonprofit was
not licensed to provide healthcare to the public, even though it was a charitable non-
profit organization).
increased quality and efficiency and without hurdles or obstacles in
integrated health care delivery systems, federal legislation could pro-
vide a necessary solution. Such legislation could be similar to the
HMO Act of 1973 and analogous (in preemption structure) to the
conditions of participation that all health care providers must meet in
order to receive Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement.
A. The HMO Act of 1973
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (the "HMO
Act") was created to foster the growth of HMOs in the United States
by providing loans and loan guarantees to those wishing to create fed-
erally qualified HMOs and by preempting any state laws that would
frustrate the creation of federally qualified HMOs. 133 More specifi-
cally, the stated purposes of the HMO Act were to decrease the cost of
medical care, move the focus of care away from provision of acute
care, and attempt to distribute medical resources more equitably.
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Given their success in California where the structure originated, Con-
gress viewed HMOs as a panacea to alleviate the problem of escalat-
ing costs in the American medical system.135 Interestingly, the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine and its legal counterparts were cited
frequently as the reason for HMOs starting slowly in the United
States, and the doctrine was part of the impetus for Congress to create
the HMO Act.
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Recognizing that state laws could create obstacles in the federal
scheme, the HMO Act preempted state law only inasmuch as a state's
133 Pub. L. No. 93-222, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. (87 Stat. 914) 3033, 3121-22; see
also William F. Megna & Charles B. Lynch, A Patients'Bill of Rights - Be Careful
What You Ask For, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, Oct. 2001, at 34.
114 See 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3122. The stated general findings for the purpose
of the HMO Act were:
(1) medical care is too expensive;
(2) the medical care system is oriented toward the provision of acute care;
(3) medical resources are maldistributed;
(4) health maintenance organizations (HMO's) will assist in alleviating the
above-mentioned problems;
(5) technical and resource assistance is needed to establish and operate
HMO's;
(6) the quality of medical care varies excessively. The Senate bill also
stated its purpose as the improvement of the health care delivery system
through the support of the creation of HMO's.
Id.
135 Id.
136 See generally Francis J. Serbaroli, The Corporate Practice Prohibition
and Managed Care, HEALTH L. & Bus. SER. (BNA) No. 2800.1001 (1999) (discussing
that organized medicine and the corporate practice of medicine doctrine were respon-
sible for the sporadic growth of HMOs at their inception).
law would prevent HMOs from operating under the terms of the fed-
eral law. 37 Otherwise, HMOs are required to comply with state laws,
and they are licensed to operate in each state in which they provide
services. Thus, the state laws that govern HMOs were allowed to
stand so long as they do not contravene the intent or language of the
federal law, an excellent example of express preemption and a coex-
isting statutory structure.
The clear benefit of express preemption is that, instead of strug-
gling with implied preemption and whether field preemption or con-
flict preemption should be applied to the statute, state licensure laws
can stand without any guesswork. 138 The difficulty with express pre-
emption is envisioning every possible permutation of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine that needs to be usurped in order for the
federal law to be effective. Further, courts have widely commented
137 The law reads as follows:
In the case of any entity -
(1) which cannot do business as a health maintenance organization in
a State in which it proposes to furnish basic and supplemental health
services because that State by law, regulation, or otherwise-
(A) requires as a condition to doing business in that State that a
medical society approve the furnishing of services by the entity,
(B) requires that physicians constitute all or a percentage of its
governing body,
(C) requires that all physicians or a percentage of physicians in
the locale participate or be permitted to participate in the provi-
sion of services for the entity,
(D) requires that the entity meet requirements for insurers of
health care services doing business in that State respecting initial
capitalization and establishment of financial reserves against in-
solvency, or
(E) imposes requirements which would prohibit the entity from
complying with the requirements of this subchapter, and
(2) for which a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee was made un-
der this subchapter or which is a qualified health maintenance organi-
zation for purposes of section 300e-9 of this title (relating to employ-
ees' health benefits plans),
such requirements shall not apply to that entity so as to prevent it from op-
erating as a health maintenance organization in accordance with section
300e of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2000) (emphasis added).
138 Under Article VI of the United States Constitution (the Supremacy
Clause), Congress creates laws that automatically usurp existing state law, unless the
legislation states otherwise. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. Because the question of degree,
meaning how much state law is preempted by the federal law, is the general problem
with preemption, the proposed statute must state as clearly as possible which state
laws can stand and which do not. See generally N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Services v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (explaining the Supreme Court's refusal to void
state statutes in conflict with federal laws absent clear congressional intent for pre-
emption).
(with dismay) on the lack of clarity in most instances of express pre-
emption, which leads courts to guess at Congressional intent and to
interpret the often ambiguous language used in the statute at issue.
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Despite any shortcomings, the presumption in favor of state law
not being preempted calls for express preemption in the new statute. 4 °
Express preemption is particularly important because medicine is an
area traditionally regulated by states under their police powers; thus,
courts most likely would be reluctant to read broad preemption into
any law intended to remedy even a long-standing problem with state
medical laws. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that, in
cases where the federal government has legislated in an area that the
states traditionally or historically regulate under their police powers,
Congress must set forth a clear intent to preempt state law.
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The HMO Act is an apt analogy for the statute that will be pro-
posed herein. Insurance is an area of the law traditionally regulated
by the states, which Congress recognized and addressed by expressly
preempting any state law that would prevent an HMO from operating
as set forth in the HMO Act. Though the law creating the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine is more varied in its sources (licensure
statutes, corporate law, case law, etc.), the proposed statute must set
forth the kind and degree of preemption necessary. It would be risky
to rely on the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congressional intent,
especially in an area that has historically been the bailiwick of state
law.
B. The Example of Medicare Conditions of Participation
Another example of a coexisting federal-state statutory scheme is
the Medicare Conditions of Participation. 42 To participate in Medi-
139 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
377 (2d ed. 2002) (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001)
and Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article about the Language of ERISA Preemption?: A
Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996)).
140 See Dublino, 413 U.S. at 413 (stating that the intent to preempt must be
clearly set forth by Congress, as the Court is reluctant to interpret the Supremacy
Clause too broadly).
141 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (indicating respect
for States as independent sovereigns and requiring express intent to preempt state law
in fields that States traditionally occupied through exercise of police powers).
142 The Conditions of Participation are found in: Ambulatory Surgical Ser-
vices, 42 C.F.R. § 416 (2003); Health Maintenance Organizations, Competitive
Medical Plans, and Health Care Prepayment Plans, 42 C.F.R. § 417 (2003); Hospice
Care, 42 C.F.R. § 418 (2003); Conditions for Medicare Payment, 42 C.F.R. § 424
(2003); Standards for Payment to Nursing Facilities and Intermediate Care Facilities
for the Mentally Retarded, 42 C.F.R. § 442 (2003); Conditions of Participation for
Hospitals, 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2003); Home Health Services, 42 C.F.R. § 484 (2003);
care, all health care providers must meet federal standards for their
specific type of health care entity, called "conditions of participation."
By example, a hospital must comply with the federal Hospital Condi-
tions of Participation not only to become a Medicare Provider but also
to maintain good standing in the Medicare program.1 43 In addition to
meeting the federal standards, a hospital must also meet state re-
quirements for licensure, and other state-imposed standards, or the
hospital cannot receive reimbursement. 44 Each of the regulatory sec-
tions that delineate conditions of participation for each type of health
care entity contains similar requirements that mandate compliance
both with federal standards and with state law.
Theoretically, the Medicare conditions of participation could pro-
vide an extant structure into which the federal remedy for the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine might be inserted; however, such a
structure would have serious limitations. First, the conditions of par-
ticipation only reach certain entities that participate in Medicare, not
the state laws directly, so entities that do not participate in Medicare
would not be reached by an addition to the conditions of participation.
Second, states would not be forced to discontinue the case law that
has developed around the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, as
the Medicare conditions of participation impose requirements on
health care providers only. While this might prevent the use of the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine as a shield (as from malprac-
tice suits or from restrictive covenant enforcement 145), it would not
Conditions of Participation: Specialized Providers, 42 C.F.R. § 485 (2003); and
Laboratory Requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 493 (2003).
143 The regulatory subchapter begins, "[h]ospitals participating in Medicare
must meet certain specified requirements; and ... [t]he Secretary may impose addi-
tional requirements if they are found necessary in the interest of the health and safety
of the individuals who are furnished services in hospitals." 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(a)(1).
144 The condition of participation for hospitals reads:
(a) The hospital must be in compliance with applicable Federal laws related
to the health and safety of patients.
(b) The hospital must be-
(1) Licensed; or
(2) Approved as meeting standards for licensing established by the
agency of the State or locality responsible for licensing hospitals.
(c) The hospital must assure that personnel are licensed or meet other ap-
plicable standards that are required by State or local laws.
42 C.F.R. § 482.11. See also Home Health Services, 42 C.F.R. § 484.10-55 (2003)
and Certification of Certain Health Facilities, 42 C.F.R. § 491.4 (2003).
145 See, e.g., United Calendar Mfg. Corp. v. Huang, 463 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983). In Huang, two physicians were able to use the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine to their benefit in order to void a restrictive covenant that had been
imposed by an unlicensed entity that had employed them. The court found that the
contract was illegal and that the physicians could not be restricted by the unlicensed
stop state courts or regulators from reading the doctrine into existing
state law or enforcing the doctrine against health care providers.
Third, CMS would likely require legislative action by Congress to
address corporate structures effectively in the conditions of participa-
tion; if Congress is needed for the action, then fully realized and novel
legislation is the plenary and more solid route.
Nevertheless, the conditions of participation provide a solid ex-
ample of effective co-regulation in the health care arena by federal
and state agencies. Though current Supreme Court jurisprudence does
not favor Congressional regulation in areas historically dominated by
state law, practically speaking, such legislation can be successful.
The next section examines whether regulating in an area traditionally
left to the states is tenable.
C. Congressional Power to Create "Traditionally State" Statutes
To propose federal action without a brief discussion as to whether
the medical industry can be deemed interstate commerce would be
remiss.146 But the discussion must be analyzed in two parts, as the
issue is not simply whether the health care industry can be considered
interstate commerce, but also whether the Supreme Court would take
issue with Congress creating a statute to govern in an area that the
states traditionally have regulated. The first issue is somewhat sim-
pler to parse than the second, which has been discussed in dicta more
often than not.
1. Health Care as Interstate Commerce
In the now-notorious decision, Justice Rehnquist set forth a three
part test in U.S. v. Lopez147 to determine whether Congress could leg-
corporation. The court also noted that the lower court had reported the plaintiff and
the defendants to the state attorney general, id. at 499, proving that no physician is
safe unless the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is eradicated. This case was a
lose-lose scenario in the end.
'4 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the source of Con-
gressional authority to create legislation such as the HMO Act and the Medicare
Conditions of Participation is the Spending Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The
Spending Clause power could be described, without much controversy, as a simpler
and broader power than Commerce Clause power, which has been narrowed and
inconsistently reinterpreted since U.S. v. Lopez. Nevertheless, it would be difficult
and impractical to create federal legislation under the Spending Clause to address the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine, because the goal would be to touch all as-
pects of healthcare, not just those that are funded by Medicare, Medicaid, and other
federal healthcare programs. Thus, the Spending Clause will not be considered here.
147 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
islate in a particular area under its Commerce Clause power. 48 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress may "regulate the use of the channels
of interstate commerce .... regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities...
[and] Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."'149 Ob-
viously, the most likely avenue for Congressional power is the last
category enumerated in Lopez, activities that have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. The decision in United States v. Morrison is
key to parsing the third part of the Lopez test.'
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It is now well known that Morrison reaffirmed the decision in Lo-
pez and narrowed Congress' power to legislate based upon findings
that a seemingly non-economic activity had "substantial effects" on
interstate commerce.' The Court in Morrison described four "con-
siderations" for determining that a substantial effect on interstate
commerce will be found.' 52 The four considerations were an apparent
attempt at a methodical approach to defining "substantial effects" on
interstate commerce (an inherently nebulous concept); each of the
148 Legal scholars and the legal community generally recognize that the Court
changed the face of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in US. v. Lopez; such a discus-
sion is outside the scope of this article. See generally LaMar F. Jost, Case Note, The
Commerce Clause in the New Millennium: Enumeration Still Presupposes Something
not Enumerated: U.S. v. Morrison, 1 Wyo. L. REv. 195, 210-12 (2001) (referencing
the "explosion of scholarly work" spawned by the Lopez decision); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 139, at 266-68 (noting that Lopez was not merely an aberration, but "the
beginning of a major change" in Commerce Clause jurisprudence); Symposium,
Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 533 (1995); Nicole Huber-
feld, Note, The Commerce Clause Post-Lopez: It's Not Dead Yet, 28 SETON HALL L.
REv. 182 (1997).
149 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
"0 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5' Id. at 617-18 (stating that Congress may not regulate a non-economic
activity based only the activity's aggregate effect on interstate commerce).
152 The four part test is as follows. First, the Court noted that "Lopez's review
of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sus-
tained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial
effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of eco-
nomic endeavor." Id. at 611 (citation omitted). Second, the law being challenged
should contain a jurisdictional element that limits the reach of the law to a set of
activities, and which have an effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 611-12. Third,
formal findings by Congress can allow the Court "to evaluate the legislative judgment
that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye." Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
Fourth, the link between the regulated activity and the effect on interstate commerce
cannot be "attenuated." Id. (citation omitted).
four points can be met by the health care industry. First, health care is
an economic endeavor for all parties involved; the Medicare system of
health insurance is a microcosmic example of this assertion. All re-
imbursement that flows from Medicare is for items or services, which
ranges from medical care, to the provision of durable medical equip-
ment, to the purchase of pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices.
Health care, unlike carrying guns in school zones or other criminal
activities that have been found not to qualify as "Commerce," is indu-
bitably an economic activity. Second, a statute could be drafted to
limit its reach to certain aspects of the corporate relationships that
exist in the health care industry to comply with Morrison. Third,
should the interstate nature of health care not be readily apparent,
Congress can turn to the Government Accounting Office to provide a
report that would support findings for this legislation. The Supreme
Court, even after Lopez and Morrison, will still seek to understand
Congressional findings regarding the nature of the activity being regu-
lated.'53 Fourth, the link between regulating corporate structures and
the delivery of medical care is not attenuated. The health care indus-
try involves shipping pharmaceuticals, medical devices, disposable
materials, even human organs, and many other materials across state
lines. Patients regularly travel to different states in order to obtain
health care services, particularly for specialized care in areas where
physicians or health care entities have established themselves as
unique experts. 54 In addition, physicians are often licensed in multi-
ple states and (with telemedicine technology advancing every day)
consult not only nationally, but internationally. The multi-state nature
153 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (noting that Congressional findings are
important in determining whether legislation fits within the Commerce Clause
framework, but not to the exclusion of judicial scrutiny in instances where the exer-
cise of Congressional power is questionable). See also U.S. v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253,
261-67 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the findings set forth by the House and Senate
committees established a rational basis upon which Congress could rely and to which
the courts should defer).
154 A related debate exists when discussing patients' willingness to travel for
care: studies have shown that the more procedures that are performed by a person or
entity, the better outcomes that person or entity will have. Some see this as an argu-
ment for adding a layer to the certificate of need process that still exists in some
states. See Richard Pfrez-Pefla, Study Finds Many Doctors Performing Surgery Lack
Practice with Procedures, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2003, at B5. The articles states:
Dozens of studies have shown that a patient has a much higher risk of seri-
ous injury or death at the hands of a surgeon or hospital that handles a par-
ticular procedure infrequently. Patient advocates.., say the numbers point
to a need for the New York State Department of Health and the hospitals
themselves to limit which hospitals and doctors provide certain services.
Id. The utility of certificates of need debate is outside the scope of this article.
of medicine forces physicians to comply with often-conflicting licen-
sure and corporate laws.
The line of cases upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act ("FACE") illuminates the widely-held agreement among
the circuit courts that health care is a national industry with which
Congress may properly concern itself and legislate accordingly.
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Starting with Cheffer v. Reno,156 and continuing through Norton v.
Ashcroft, 157 the federal circuit courts have consistently held, both be-
fore and after U.S. v. Lopez and U.S. v. Morrison, that Congress'
Commerce Clause power is able to reach the health care industry. 58
The Supreme Court recently rejected a bid by anti-abortion protesters
to examine FACE, which has left standing the agreement among the
circuits that Congress has properly exercised its Commerce Clause
authority in creating FACE. 159 The reasoning in the FACE line of
cases has been consistent.' As the Gregg court summarized, the
actions of abortion protesters were deemed properly regulated by
Congress because they directly affected an economic activity, namely
the provision of services by reproductive health clinics, entities that
are "income-generating businesses that employ physicians and other
staff to provide services and goods to their patients.' 61  The court
distinguished the provision of health care from the activities regulated
by statutes that had been struck down by the Supreme Court in more
recent decisions. Unlike the Violence against Women Act, which
155 The circuit courts have consistently held that FACE is valid under the
Commerce Clause. See United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971 (2001); United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1114 (2001); United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292,
296 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1071 (1999); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d
575, 588 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1136 (1998); United States v. Bird,
124 F.3d 667, 682 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998); Terry v. Reno,
101 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1264 (1997); United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. deniedsub nom. Hatch v.
United States, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919
(8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d
675, 683 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 806 (1996); Cheffner v. Reno, 55
F.3d 1517, 1520 (1 lth Cir. 1995).
156 55 F.3d at 1519-21.
157 298 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2002).
158 See Gregg, 226 F.3d at 262.
,59 Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1172 (2003). See also Justices Let Stand Ruling that FACE Does Not Violate Free
Speech of Protesters, 10 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 168 (Jan. 30, 2003). This denial of
petition for certiorari also leaves standing the decision that FACE does not violate the
First Amendment rights of the anti-abortion protesters that violate its proscriptions.
See Norton, 298 F.3d at 552-53 (describing FACE as content-neutral).
160 Gregg, 226 F.3d at 261.
161 Id at 262.
sought to regulate criminal activity directed at women, or the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, which sought to keep firearms away from
schoolchildren, the Gregg court acknowledged that a "national mar-
ket" exists for certain health care services in the United States.162
That market involves operations that generate income and provides
services that the protesters sought to terminate entirely.1 63 Thus, al-
though the abortion protesters' motivations were not economic, the
Third Circuit concluded that the legislation appropriately regulated
commerce due to the widespread effects on economic activity.' 64 The
circuits are in agreement on this point of law.
165
Many of the points that were made specifically in the context of
abortion clinics can apply generally to health care in the United States.
For instance, the Senate Committee describing the interstate commer-
cial activities of abortion clinics could have been describing almost
any health care facility, stating, "[t]hey purchase medicine, medical
supplies, surgical instruments and other necessary medical products,
often from other States; they employ staff; they own and lease office
space; they generate income. In short, the Committee finds that they
operate within the stream of interstate commerce."'
' 66
Conscionable, even persuasive, arguments thus can be made that
Congress would have the power under the Commerce Clause to prop-
erly legislate a cure for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
The descriptions of the business of medicine that applied in the clinic
context are equally apt in discussing other types of health care entities
and the services they provide. Hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory
care facilities, physical therapy centers, psychiatric care facilities,
home health agencies, hospices-all purchase medicine, medical sup-
plies, surgical instruments, and other medical products from across the
country; and they employ staff, own and lease space and equipment,
and generate income. If the argument has been acceptable to the cir-
cuit courts in the heated and often non-objective world of reproductive
services clinics, then they equally pass the "straight face test" in the
less emotionally-charged corporate practice of medicine arena. The
discussion cannot end here, however, because the proposed statute
would regulate in an area traditionally governed by states.
162 226 F.3d at 266, n.4.
163 Id. at 262 (explaining how anti-abortion protestors goal when violating
FACE is to "temporarily and permanently interrupt the operations of reproductive
health facilities and prevent individuals from accessing their services").
'64 Id. at 262-63.
165 Id. at 261 (noting that the Third Circuit was one of the last appellate courts
to examine FACE and that the court was aligning with the other circuit courts in its
decision that FACE was a proper exercise of Congress Clause power by Congress).
166 Id. at 264, citing S. REP. No. 103-117, at 31 (1993).
2. Areas Traditionally Regulated by the States
An issue that has often arisen in Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
but that is rarely the determining factor in the Court's holding, in-
volves whether the federal government is attempting to legislate in an
area that states traditionally regulate. The Court has been more likely
to strike down federal legislation as overreaching the bounds of
Commerce Clause power if Congress has attempted to usurp areas
traditionally covered by the police powers of the states, such as family
law, criminal law, or public health. The current trend in Supreme
Court opinions seems to be to discuss this as a motivating but not de-
termining factor, generally due to the opinion in Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority.167 Again by example, Lopez and
Morrison called into question all federal statutes that regulate areas
traditionally governed by the states.' 68 As a result, many statutes that
fall within the states' police power, such as the Child Support Recov-
ery Act,169 have the potential to be subject to challenge. This is not
simply due to the limiting nature of Lopez and Morrison vis-A-vis
appropriate exercises of Commerce Clause power; the potential for
this type of statute to be called into question derives from a long his-
tory of the Court challenging federal power to regulate areas tradition-
ally reserved for the states. In many ways, this is the heart of the de-
bate about the limits of federalism. 1
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In one of the most famous discussions of federal encroachment on
state sovereignty, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, the Court determined that jurisprudential decisions cannot be
made based on historical state functions and, therefore, to strike down
federal legislation based upon fear of intruding in the states' tradi-
tional domain is an untenable method of reasoning through federalism
and Commerce Clause issues.171 In discussing the need to overrule
167 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that attempts to draw the boundaries of state
regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is both unwork-
able and inconsistent with established principles of federalism).
168 See, e.g., Daniel Robert Zmijewski, The Child Support Recovery Act and
Its Constitutionality after U.S. v. Morrison, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 289 (2003)
(analyzing whether Lopez and Morrison would invalidate Congress' use of the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the traditional state-governed area of family law).
169 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000).
170 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (stating "the concern that we expressed in
Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority seems well founded.").
171 469 U.S. at 546-47. Garcia was arguably overruled by subsequent legisla-
tion, but the fundamental discussion and analysis remain pertinent. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-7 (2000) (denying a sovereign immunity exception to any state who receivqs
federal funding and violates a federal anti-discrimination law).
National League of Cities v. Usery,'72 the Court scrutinized the im-
possibility of defining "traditional" or "historical" state functions and
the difficulty that federal courts had in applying the Usery standard.
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The Court rejected the use of historical state roles as too gray to be
useful or knowable, because history exists as a spectrum of state gov-
ernance and power.174 Conversely, the Court also rejected the notion
of traditional or historical federal regulation in an area, drawing on the
milestone transformation that the federal government underwent dur-
ing the New Deal and the important expansion of the federal govern-
ment's power to create legislation protective of civil rights starting in
the 1960s.171 The Court thus rejected a "sacred province of state
autonomy." 176 Given the outright rejection of the "historical state
domain" argument in Garcia, it is no surprise that this theory exists
now only as a bolster for other Commerce Clause discussions. Never-
theless, more recent cases have spent enough time exploring historical
state functions that the topic is not moot.
177
172 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
1'' Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-47.
174 The Court wrote:
The most obvious defect of a historical approach to state immunity is that it
prevents a court from accommodating changes in the historical functions of
States, changes that have resulted in a number of once-private functions like
education being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. At the same
time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, namely, its
promise of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory.
Reliance on history as an organizing principle results in line-drawing of the
most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state governmental functions stretches
over a historical continuum from before the Revolution to the present, and
courts would have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of
state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority to be defeated.
Id. at 543-44 (footnotes omitted).
"' See id. at 544, n.10.
176 Id. at 554 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
177 To briefly review an example, the Court in Morrison buttressed its analy-
sis with a discussion of traditional state government roles. The heart of the rejection
of the Violence against Women Act was that the behavior regulated, as characterized
by the majority, was not in any way related to economic activity. 529 U.S. at 613. To
strengthen the point, the majority wrote, "[w]e accordingly reject the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a dis-
tinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Id. at 617-18. The
majority further noted that the aggregate effects on commerce argument, without an
economic effect, could not be permitted because it would allow Congress to regulate
"family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly signifi-
cant." Id. at 615-16. Of course, in a strongly worded and notorious dissent, Justice
Souter criticized the majority for returning to the pre-New Deal form of jurispru-
dence, when a formalistic distinction between economic and non-economic activities
Admittedly, health care has been an area traditionally left to the
states, but unlike violent crime, health care is considered an industry,
a marketplace, and a profession, and is certainly an economic activity.
Thus, even taking the majority in Morrison's federalism analysis at
face value, it can be distinguished in this article's discussion because
health care is not non-economic activity. One need only review the
discussion in the FACE line of cases to recall that the circuits are in
agreement on this point.
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The reasoning in this area is circular. If a power is enumerated in
the Constitution, then Congress may exercise it. If a power is not
enumerated, then it is reserved to the states. But if the power has been
subject to fluctuating jurisprudence, or if arguments can be made for
both fitting within an enumerated power and being relegated to an
area that the states traditionally regulate, then the question is answered
by a matter of perspective and interpretation, not by clear constitu-
tional language. This conundrum was well described in New York v.
U.S., where the Court notes that the Tenth Amendment is "essentially
a tautology.' 79
Despite the jurisprudential inconsistencies, a reasonable conclu-
sion can be reached that Congress would have the power under the
Commerce Clause, despite federalism concerns, to legislate in the
field of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The next section
ponders how such legislation could be drafted.
D. Creating a New Statutory Scheme
Much attention is being given to improving the quality of health
care, containing costs, driving out fraud, and furthering the capitalist
vision of the health care industry. It has become clear that the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine is a shadowy, unknowable doctrine
that is outdated and potentially obstructive. The doctrine creates a
disparate system of state-based law that prevents physicians from
fully integrating into health care delivery, which is, more and more, an
interstate and national industry. Therefore, though the goal may have
once been to ensure reliable medical care, the doctrine cannot promote
quality of care today. The exclusive and independent nature of this
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence lead to the court-packing plan and to jurispru-
dence that was inevitably overturned. See id. at 644-47. Justice Souter not so subtly
accused the majority of returning to an unworkable economic/non-economic distinc-
tion to serve their personal viewpoints on federalism. Id. at 644-45. While Justice
Souter may be correct, the accusations do not help the current analysis, which must
focus on the majority's interest in traditional state roles.
178 See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
179 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
guild doctrine is such that those who are protected by it will be inher-
ently prevented from full participation in a national health care sys-
tem. Further, given the federal and state governments' emphasis on
fraud and abuse prevention and enforcement, physicians have quite
clearly shown themselves to be influenced by financial incentives.
Finally, the states seem to be unable to disentangle themselves from
their individual corporate practice of medicine fiefdoms. Without the
federal government's intervention, this doctrine will continue to hob-
ble health care delivery and development.
A federal statute addressing the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine would need to define "practicing medicine" to include indi-
viduals and corporate entities, regardless of a state's definition of
"practicing medicine." The statute should clearly state that it is not
intended to preempt state licensure law, but it would allow local rules
of licensure and practice ethics to remain. The statute would function
not unlike the Medicare Conditions of Participation, which add a layer
of programmatic requirements that work in conjunction with state
licensure law but that also allow states to make individualized deter-
minations about issues that are traditionally within the realm of state
police power. 80 Unlike the Medicare Conditions of Participation, this
statute would not find the Constitutional basis of authority in the
Spending Power; it would be grounded in Congress' authority to leg-
islate under the Commerce Clause. Acknowledging that reliance on
Commerce Clause power can be a tricky proposition, it is not far-
fetched given recent jurisprudence, as the discussion above has de-
scribed.
The statute could fit in title 42 of the United States Code because
it regulates public health and welfare, or title 18 of the United States
Code, because it regulates commerce. By way of example, the act
could read as follows:
An Act to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide as-
sistance and encouragement for the establishment of relation-
ships between health care providers and to prevent interpreta-
tion of certain state laws from interfering in the relationships
between physicians and other health care providers, whether
they be persons, corporations, or other legal entities.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress Assembled:
180 See the discussion of Medicare conditions of participation, supra note 144
and accompanying text.
Section 1: This Act may be cited as the "Health Care Pro-
vider Unification and Quality Improvement Act."
Section 2: The Public Health Service Act is amended by add-
ing after Title __ the following new title:
(a) Definitions:
For purposes of this subchapter,
(1) "Corporate practice of medicine" means any state
law, set of laws, regulations, or common law that lim-
its the practice of medicine to individuals and that in-
terprets such laws to indicate that only individuals,
and not corporations or other corporate entities, can
practice medicine.
(2) "Health care provider" means any individual li-
censed to practice medicine, including medical doc-
tors, doctors of osteopathy, nurse practitioners, physi-
cal therapists, occupational therapists, chiropractors,
dentists, podiatrists, physician assistants, and any
other person that is required to obtain a license to
hold him or herself out as a health care practitioner.
(b) Corporations are hereby permitted to engage in
the practice of medicine through duly licensed
health care professionals and to contract with health
care professionals to the extent necessary to obtain
such services and to deliver health care in the most
efficient and quality-conscious method.
(c) Each law that regulates the corporate practice
of medicine is hereby preempted to the extent that
such law conflicts with the provisions of this sub-
chapter. This subchapter shall not be read to pre-
vent states from licensing physicians or other health
care providers, or to preempt state law of corpora-
tions, or to preempt state licensure standards for
health care professionals or health care entities that
function to protect the general health and welfare of
state residents.
(d) This act shall not be interpreted to limit the
proscriptions of or supercede any existing federal
fraud and abuse prevention statute, including but not
limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) and 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn.
(e) This act is effective as of__, 200
Admittedly, this language is not perfect, but it would be a start in
the right direction. (Doubtless the statute's provisions would be
added to some omnibus legislation that would change its structure and
context.) Whether the law would be a part of Title 18 or Title 42 is
not important. What is important is to finally take the step that has
been suggested for over two decades now. Though many have ex-
pressed frustration with the corporate practice of medicine doctrine,
none have described a universal remedy. This could be the solution
that is needed.
CONCLUSION
Given all of the debate and concern about quality of care, health
care cost containment, and effectuating a health care system that is
closer to the market-driven model of other systems in this country, the
time has come to rid ourselves of this archaic doctrine. It does noth-
ing to advance quality of care; its premise is outdated; and, given the
federal government's dogged focus on fraud and abuse enforcement, it
is disingenuous to continue to pretend that physicians are not influ-
enced by financial gain. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine
is the black sheep of licensure law, a convoluted interpretation of stat-
utes that no longer legitimately protect the public. Federal statutory
interference could help to end this wild ride.

